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Abstract 
In this thesis I consider ubuntu as a metonym for the particularly African features of South 
African philosophy. Given that Mbembe critiques African philosophy in general as having 
failed because it has been subsumed under two unreflective political movements in African 
thought, I consider whether or not the concept of ubuntu escapes his critique. After 
developing criteria for measuring the success of any philosophical concept, I conclude that 
ubuntu is unsuccessful. I then identify the political constraints placed on ubuntu that lead to 
its failure. These constraints arise from having to validate Africa as a place of intellectual 
worth. Considering the role of place in these constraints, I argue that a far more productive 
approach to ubuntu (and South African philosophy in general) is to explicitly incorporate this 
place into our philosophical project. I use the conceptual framework developed by Bruce Janz 
to provide a systematic account of place that can be used in formulating South African 
philosophy. I add to Janz, arguing that philosophy is a response to a particular feature of 
place: the mystery. By incorporating place into ubuntu, I am able to start developing a 
philosophical concept which can fulfil the political constraints placed on ubuntu without 
sacrificing its philosophical integrity. I suggest that ubuntu remains an interesting concept 
primarily because it promises to respond to the fragmentation of the South African place. I 
conclude by arguing that ubuntu should be used as the basis for a civic religion which 
responds to the fragmentation of the South African place. This civic religion will give rise to 
a significantly distinct philosophical tradition which should not succumb to Mbembe’s 
critique. 
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 Preliminary remarks: 
 
Is South African Philosophy Successful? 
South Africa often sits on the boundary between being an international heavy-weight and 
being ‘just another third-world country’. Different sectors of South African life fare 
differently when the question of how successful South Africa has been is raised. So it makes 
sense to ask whether or not South African philosophy has been successful. Worryingly, 
Achille Mbembe (2002) identifies a fundamental failure in African Philosophy in general, 
and one must wonder whether this applies to South African philosophy. According to him, 
African philosophy has failed to become a rigorous, critical tradition of thought because it 
has been subverted by non-philosophical, ‘political’1 concerns: African Philosophy has time 
and again found itself having to submit to politically contingent demands which have little 
regard for truth or accurate reflection. But what makes this failure all the more remarkable is 
that Africa as a context in fact shares many traits that have given rise to some of the best, and 
most interesting, philosophical traditions. Mbembe compares the history of suffering and 
struggle that is the foundation of African intellectual projects with the similar histories that 
have given rise to Jewish and German traditions of philosophy (2002: 240). In these two 
traditions, a history of suffering and struggle has prompted a deeper reflection on, and a 
deeper philosophical understanding of, the human condition. What confounds Mbembe is 
that, despite sharing a similar history of suffering and struggle, African Philosophy has failed 
to take on the reflective attitudes displayed in its counterparts. Conversely, in fact, Africa’s 
focus on the tragedy of its history has prevented African Philosophy from presenting a 
reflective, deep picture of the human condition.  
Does what Mbembe have to say about African Philosophy apply to South African 
philosophy? I suggest that we treat South African philosophy as a potentially distinct 
tradition. By ‘distinct tradition’, I mean that the tradition is a recognisable intellectual 
movement that is not easily confused with other intellectual movements. It is potentially so 
because, arguably, it is not distinct from other traditions, though we may have reasons to 
consider it as a distinct tradition. I discuss these reasons later, throughout my thesis. If, even 
though we have good reasons to consider South African philosophy to be a potentially 
distinct tradition, we cannot show it to be actually distinct from other traditions, then it 
appears that South African philosophy fails before we even get to the point of comparing it 
                                                          
1
 This is my own term. Mbembe does not label these concerns himself. Praeg (2008) identifies what he calls 
‘performative principles’ which I believe to be the same thing. 
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with Mbembe’s critique. In terms of the methods used in South Africa, South African 
philosophy is arguably simply an extension of various European Philosophical traditions. 
Philosophy as it is taught in South African universities is roughly divided into two distinct 
traditions – ‘English’ analytic philosophy and ‘Afrikaans’ philosophy. The English tradition 
has followed many of the philosophical developments that have occurred in the Anglophone 
world; while Afrikaans philosophy has followed in the footsteps of Continental traditions. 
With a few exceptions,
2
 South African philosophy (or its subsets) has in this sense failed to 
be distinct enough to be considered a tradition worthy of being judged successful. In this 
respect, at best, South African philosophy is merely a ‘colony’ or extension of two other 
philosophical traditions. If we are at all to ask questions about the state of South African 
Philosophy, conceiving of South African Philosophy in this way will prove to be a futile task. 
Yet, there does seem to be a way that we could conceive of South African philosophy 
as a distinct tradition. If we consider a philosophical tradition as a set of responses to 
particular problems, then we may be able to conceive of South African Philosophy as a 
separate tradition. Although South African universities often teach the philosophy that arose 
in response to European problems,
3
 the South African context brings with it a series of 
problems not covered in the standard (Western) philosophy syllabus. These problems include 
racism, dealing with a history of oppression and the ethics of cross-cultural communication. 
South African philosophy as a response to the South African context and its problems can 
thus be seen as meeting some of the conditions to become a distinct tradition. Of course, this 
should not be taken to mean that all philosophy done in South Africa is South African 
philosophy – at least not without a substantial argument. Rather, we should take it that, if we 
are to look for a South African philosophical tradition, it would be found in those writings 
that respond to particularly South African problems. The concept of ubuntu meets this 
criterion. Ubuntu came to the fore as a philosophical concept during South Africa’s political 
transition from being an Apartheid state to one which is ostensibly a ‘post-Apartheid’ state. 
Ubuntu played a prominent role in providing a theoretical framework for the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the several momentous court cases in South Africa. We can 
therefore see ubuntu as a concept developed in response to the problems found in South 
Africa. Furthermore, historically and linguistically, ubuntu can only be traced to places and 
                                                          
2
 For example, Jan Smuts’s remarkable, but hardly explored, work on holism: see Smuts, J.C., Holism and 
Evolution, The MacMillan Company: New York, 1924, 1926 (2
nd
 Edition). 
3
 For example, Descartes developed Cartesian Skepticism as a Christian, idealist response to early Atheist 
materialism. The structure of Cartesian Skepticism is shaped by the ideological commitments that Descartes had 
both to religion and a particular form of the scientific method.  
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languages within Africa. It thus also avoids being seen as an ‘import’ into the South African 
place. We can therefore be safe in saying that ubuntu is a distinctly African, South African 
concept. I suggest that we approach this concept as a ‘kernel’ or particularly salient point 
around which a tradition can be constructed. 
Unfortunately for our investigation into South African philosophy’s success, the 
South African context bears many similarities with other African contexts. South Africa has 
been the locus of violent oppression, first in the form of slavery and colonialism, and later in 
the form of Apartheid. Although Apartheid was unique to South Africa to the extent that it 
was codified in our law, Fanon argues that Apartheid was nothing more than a more blatant 
expression of the segregation and oppression that characterise all other colonial states (1963). 
So, we have good reason see South African philosophy as taking part in the same trends as 
the rest of the continent. Furthermore, it has been noted in numerous places that African, 
Bantu cultures are remarkably homogenous. Ubuntu has cognates in languages as far north as 
Uganda and it has featured in other African countries as a politically useful philosophical 
concept.
4
 If we are to take the contextual route of defining a philosophical tradition, South 
African philosophy bears enough significant similarities with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa 
for us to classify it as a subset of African Philosophy, if perhaps a particularly distinct and 
interesting one. 
Considering the similarities that South African philosophy, especially ubuntu, shares 
with other African philosophical traditions, one must take seriously the issue of whether or 
not Mbembe’s critique applies to South African Philosophy. This thesis, then, takes ubuntu as 
a metonym for South African philosophy. In what follows, I argue that ubuntu has not 
escaped Mbembe’s criticism, despite having the potential to become a successful 
philosophical concept. Starting with an exegesis of the failed body of literature on ubuntu, I 
investigate why it has failed. I then propose a way in which the debate must be 
reconceptualised for ubuntu to become a successful philosophical concept. This 
reconceptualisation, however, is meant to apply to South African philosophy as a whole, 
which for lack of success as a response to the problems particular to South Africa, has failed 
to become a noteworthy distinctive tradition in philosophy. This does not mean that we need 
                                                          
4
 For examples of ubuntu appearing in other African places, see Stanlake, J., Samkange, S and Samkange, T. M. 
Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indegenous Political Philosophy. Harare: Graham Publishing, 1980; and 
Tambulasi, R. and Kayuni, H., 2005. ‘Can African Feet Divorce Western Shoes? The Case of ‘Ubuntu’ and 
Democratic Good Governance in Malawi,’ Nordic Journal of African Studies 14(2): 147–161. 
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ubuntu specifically to succeed in order to become a noteworthy philosophical tradition. 
Rather, by looking at the problems inherent in the debate on ubuntu and by considering a 
potential solution to these metaphilosophical problems, we should be able to develop all 
debates in South African Philosophy in a way that promises to be philosophically noteworthy. 
Ubuntu is meant to act as an anchor for this discussion, a symbol which we can manipulate to 
gain a greater abstract understanding of our position. 
The discussion on ubuntu, however, is fraught with problems. In order to write 
meaningfully about ubuntu, one needs to address these problems – otherwise they will 
undermine the project from the outset. In this thesis, I use some of the more interesting 
problems as a starting point for my argument. There are, however, some more basic problems 
that must be dealt with first. I need to make several clarificatory remarks about ubuntu and 
how I write about it so that these problems do not undermine the project as a whole. The first 
remark is about how I will speak about ubuntu, the next remark is about the type of ubuntu 
that this thesis is concerned with, and the last three remarks are worries that are often raised 
in any debate on ubuntu. 
 
First Remark: Terminology 
 For now, I call ubuntu a ‘concept’. A concept, for the sake of this argument, is meant to 
designate the loosest category of philosophical entities. All critiques, ideologies, ethical 
codes, values and these categories themselves are concepts as I use the term here. One major 
problem in the debate on ubuntu is that there is little agreement about what sort of concept 
ubuntu is. That there is such a disagreement indicates that any classification of ubuntu will 
need a supporting argument. This I do in Chapter 4. Before I put forward such a supporting 
argument, a particular conceptual framework needs to be developed. This is because of the 
problems discussed in Chapter 1. Until then, I use ‘concept’ as a neutral placeholder. 
 
Second remark: Which Ubuntu? 
Leonard Praeg notes that there are two things we could mean when we talk of ubuntu.
5
 There 
is what we can call ubuntu-praxis
6
 and Ubuntu-theory. Ubuntu-praxis is the lived expression 
of certain humanistic values. Although we hold that practitioners of ubuntu-praxis are 
expressly conscious of the values informing their behaviour, we would not call ubuntu-praxis 
                                                          
5
 Praeg, L., Postgraduate Seminar Course on Ubuntu, at the Department of International Studies and Political 
Science, Rhodes University, July to November 2011. 
6
 Praeg specifically talks about ‘praxis’. I prefer ‘lived philosophy’. As my thesis will not focus on this form of 
ubuntu, it is currently irrelevant to try and cash out the differences between the two labels.  
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a philosophy in the same sense that deontology or utilitarianism are philosophies. This is 
because ubuntu-praxis is not codified in the same way that deontology and utilitarianism are. 
At most, ubuntu-praxis is a lived philosophy, or a worldview in the common sense of the 
word. Significantly for ubuntu as a philosophical concept, ubuntu-praxis informs and gives 
rise to Ubuntu-theory.
7
 It is thus generally understood that the creation of Ubuntu-theory is 
the result of the effort to create a written form of ubuntu-praxis. In South Africa, while we do 
speak of ubuntu as a normative concept, it is a concept that remains sensitive to its foundation 
in ubuntu-praxis. Ubuntu-theory is thus like deontology and utilitarianism in that it exists 
primarily as a codified (written) set of norms. For the purposes of analysing the success of 
South African philosophy, we are not concerned with ubuntu-praxis. Rather, when I write 
‘ubuntu’, what I am referring to is the philosophical concept – ubuntu-theory – which tries to 
reflect the normative principles supposedly expressed in ubuntu-praxis. So, when I say, 
‘Ubuntu is failing,’ I do not mean that South Africans are failing to live up to the humanistic 
values of ubuntu (though this may be true), but rather that the philosophical concept is failing 
to be expressed in a way that reveals its philosophical value. 
 
Third, fourth and fifth remarks: Is ubuntu the type of concept we ought to be concerned with? 
Now, let us turn to the three worries. These worries are grouped together because they are 
often raised to show that ubuntu ought not to be the subject of a philosophical paper, either 
because ubuntu is not really a distinctive philosophical concept, or because it is a set of pre-
critical and troublesome codified norms. The worries can be cashed out as follows: 1) ubuntu 
is not a philosophy, but rather a set of obsolete and unattractive cultural norms; 2) ubuntu is 
inherently essentialist; and 3) ubuntu is simply a universal value expressed in a local 
language. The first two of these worries have to do with the attractiveness of ubuntu; they can 
be understood as asking, ‘Is ubuntu really the kind of philosophy we want to be doing?’ The 
last worry is in fact recognition of a problem which is plaguing the literature on ubuntu. This 
final worry will bring me to the first chapter of my thesis and the problematic context of 
ubuntu. Despite trying to deal with all these worries here, the second of these worries will 
continue to be addressed throughout this thesis. The worry is that ubuntu risks being 
unremarkable if it is not essentialist. The aim of this thesis is to show how ubuntu can be 
remarkable and distinctive, without being essentialist. In what follows, I will unpack each of 
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 Praeg, L., Postgraduate Seminar Course on Ubuntu, at the Department of International Studies and Political 
Science, Rhodes University, July to November 2011. 
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these worries. Furthermore, while space does not allow me to put these worries to rest once 
and for all, I will argue that they should not prevent us from investigating ubuntu further.  
 
Third Remark: First Worry: ‘Ubuntu is just a set of obsolete norms’ 
The first worry is that ubuntu is not a philosophical concept, but a set of obsolete norms. Ilze 
Keevey critiques ubuntu precisely along these lines (2009). For her, ubuntu necessarily 
entails a set of cultural practices, which include a strict familial hierarchy and patriarchy. She 
argues that we should be dubious of ubuntu’s attractiveness given that it is often associated 
with cultural practices that are not themselves attractive. Similarly, Mogobe Ramose holds 
that ubuntu necessarily entails the religious belief in the continued presence of ancestors, or 
the ‘living dead’ (2003). Ramose’s ubuntu is a quasi-religious concept which plays some 
philosophical role. Due to its dependence on a metaphysical picture of the world particular to 
the religious tenets of traditional Africans, this form of ubuntu is highly susceptible to being 
rejected by others who do not share the same metaphysical picture. If what Keevey and 
Ramose say is true, then ubuntu loses credibility as an interesting philosophical concept. At 
best, their ubuntu is a concept so particular to a culture that it belongs more to the discipline 
of anthropology than philosophy; at worst, if their ubuntu is taken seriously as a contender in 
the philosophical arena of debate, it could herald a step back towards societal structures 
which have already been shown to be undesirable by feminist and secularist writers. 
Keevey’s and Ramose’s ubuntu stops being a concept that non-Africans can take seriously as 
a contending philosophical worldview.  
Although I argue that we should pay attention to something about Ramose and 
Keevey’s arguments, it is not clear that ubuntu is the same thing as patriarchy or a particular 
spiritual worldview. Nor does it seem that we should conflate ubuntu with all cultural 
practices in African cultures. In fact, the exact opposite is true: ubuntu is conceptually 
distinguishable from its context. An instance that demonstrates ubuntu’s conceptual 
separation from its context is its ability to reform cultural norms. For example, Archbishop 
Emeritus Desmond Tutu was able to appeal to ubuntu as a reason why black South Africans 
should not engage in retributive justice or violence against others. Evidently, it is not the case 
that African cultures do not have cultural norms of retributive justice and violence.
8
 One need 
only look at cases of witch-hunts and necklacing to see that African cultures, like most 
others, have traditions of violence and retribution. Yet, during the Truth and Reconciliation 
                                                          
8
 See, for instance, Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling, Pietermaritzburg, SA: University of 
Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009. 
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Commission (TRC), Tutu was able to appeal to ubuntu to reform people’s behaviour. This 
shows that ubuntu is conceptually different from the cultural practices which surround it.
9
 So 
we should view ubuntu as a concept which is found in a complex and not necessarily 
consistent set of cultural norms. Therefore, we can judge the merit of ubuntu without needing 
to call up the contradictory aspects of African cultures.  
In this way, ubuntu is similar to the Christian concept of love and Aristotle’s concept 
of the eudaimonic life. Both of these concepts exist originally within a complex framework 
which may not always be consistent or attractive to non-Christians or non-Aristotelians. 
However, thinkers working within these movements have been able to use these concepts to 
refine their frameworks. Such was the case when the Anglican Church decided that allowing 
female clergy is more in line with Jesus’ teaching of love than a strict adherence to Biblical 
patriarchy could be. Also, we have been able to ‘export’ these concepts from their original 
contexts. Thus, Martha Nussbaum has been able to use the concept of Aristotelian 
eudaimonia in a modern, liberal framework that Aristotle would probably have found 
completely at odds with his own philosophy.
10
 Ubuntu, it seems, shows the same promise, 
which is one of the reasons why philosophers such as Thaddeus Metz have been able to apply 
it to fields such as medical ethics.
11
 
  
Fourth Remark: Second Worry: Essentialism 
The second worry is that ubuntu may be inherently essentialist. There can be no doubt that 
the concept of ubuntu is often appealed to in this way. Gade points out that some South 
Africans hold that ubuntu is a characteristic that only black South Africans can have (2012: 
495-497). Also when used to bolster nationalistic rhetoric, it is assumed that ubuntu is 
something that only (some) South Africans can have access to.
12
 If this were a necessary 
aspect of ubuntu, then there would be very good pragmatic and ethical reasons to avoid the 
concept altogether. Gade (2012), however, points out that there are multiple conceptions of 
ubuntu. While some are essentialist, there are also both inclusive and exclusive conceptions 
                                                          
9
 It should be noted that many black Africans feel that ubuntu’s injunction against retributive violence and for 
forgiveness was misapplied in this instance. But this is a separate matter as to whether or not ubuntu is a 
normative concept.  
10
 See Nussbaum, M. ‘Capabilities and Human Rights’ in Fordham Law Review (2007) vol 66(2), pp 273-300. 
11
 See Thaddeus Metz (2010). ‘An African Theory of Bioethics: Reply to Macpherson and Macklin.’ 
Developing World Bioethics 10 (3):158-163. 
12
 See Gade, C.B.N. (2012), ‘What is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African 
Descent’ in The South African Journal of Philosophy, 31(3) pp. 484-503 ; Marx, C. (2002). ‘Ubu and Ubuntu: 
on the dialectics of apartheid and nation building’. In Politikon. Vol. 29. No. 1 pp. 49-69.; and Zapiro 
‘Xenophobia and the Meaning of Ubuntu’ in The Sunday Time, 25 May 2008. 
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that do not resort to essentialism. The non-essentialist conceptions of ubuntu see it as a 
performative feature of a human being; in other words, it is a characteristic which people 
have solely by virtue of a persistent behaviour. For example, Desmond Tutu tells us that 
remarking that someone has ubuntu is nothing more than the acknowledgement of a 
praiseworthy personality trait (1999: 32). Similarly, IsiXhosa speakers with whom I have 
spoken have often asserted that a person may or may not have ubuntu regardless of their race 
or place of origin. Ubuntu is therefore an observable characteristic of a person’s behaviour. 
One does not automatically have it by virtue of one’s skin colour or culture. Rather, ubuntu as 
a personality trait must be performed for it to be said to exist. In this sense, Ubuntu is more 
like Aristotelian virtue than Aryan perfection. Of course, the problem with this explanation of 
ubuntu is that it does not demonstrate how ubuntu is particularly African. As we shall see 
later in this thesis, one of the constraints placed on the debate around ubuntu is that its 
African identity be easily identifiable. As I have said, the aim of this thesis is to show how we 
can guard ubuntu’s African identity, without resorting to essentialism. 
 
Fifth Remark: Third Worry: ‘Ubuntu is a Universal Concept in Local Garb’ 
The third worry is that ubuntu is just a universal concept ‘in local garb’. As I have already 
said, this worry is indicative of a very real problem with the literature on ubuntu, one which I 
shall call the Problem of Collapsibility. This Problem needs to be dealt with in its own right, 
and I do this in the first chapter. But we need to deal with a certain bias with Western 
Philosophy towards concepts from other philosophies: that is that they are simply analogues 
of concepts already familiar to Western Philosophy. What I propose here is a heuristic shift in 
bias. Later in this thesis, I develop a more complete argument for why we should not see 
ubuntu as nothing more than an analogue for concepts already familiar to Western 
Philosophy. Before I can do this, I need to put a framework in place which happens in 
Chapter 2. For now, it is just important that I open up the possibility that ubuntu is not 
analogous to already familiar concepts.  
Despite the strong tendency for philosophers to believe that their ideas are universally 
applicable, we must admit that all philosophy develops within a specific context, or ‘culture’. 
We already recognise this by recognising that Ancient Greek Philosophy is distinct from 19
th
 
century German philosophy or classical Chinese philosophy. Of course, philosophy aims at a 
universal, abstract or fundamental understanding of the world in its entirety and not only its 
12 
 
own culture.
13
 For this reason, any culture’s philosophy will see its projects as universal, in 
the sense that they do and should apply to any given context. Having said this, each culture 
imbues its philosophy with context-specific aspects. Generally, members of a given culture 
are unable to differentiate between the ‘truly universal’14 aspects of their philosophy and 
those that are entirely particular to their culture. This is because both culturally particular and 
‘universal’ aspects of a philosophical tradition appear universal to members of that culture. 
Similarly, at least some cultures will not have struck upon all universal projects, values and 
ideas.  
While we in the Western, Greco-Roman descended traditions of philosophy have been 
quick to point out where other cultures have failed to hit upon our ‘universals’, we have by 
and large been ignorant of the possibility that many of the ‘universals’ that we identify are 
not in fact universal, or that other cultures may have delineated universal values that we have 
not. Western philosophy is as much limited by the constraints of cultural presuppositions as 
any other culture. For this reason, the safest starting point is particularism. Particularism as I 
use it here is simply the doctrine that each culture’s philosophical concepts are particular to it. 
We may, after extensive comparison, find that there are indeed universal concepts that span 
the spectrum of cultures, but this is not to be assumed from the beginning. What I propose 
here is that we grant all claims of particularity to each and every culture when investigating 
its philosophy. For this reason, I suggest that we take seriously the claim that ubuntu is a 
particularly African concept and not simply a local name for a universal concept. 
 
If these three worries do not undermine talking about ubuntu as a philosophical concept, then 
we ought at least to take seriously the claim that ubuntu is an African philosophical concept. 
If it fails as a philosophical concept, it is not for some obvious reason. This is not to say that 
talking about ubuntu is without serious problems. But I have put forward a case for why we 
should spend the time trying to resolve these problems – arguing that there is no reason that 
ubuntu should not hold promise as a philosophically interesting concept. What remains now 
is to investigate why the philosophical debate on ubuntu has not managed to be widely 
recognised as philosophically valuable. 
 
                                                          
13
 This is admittedly a very loose definition of ‘philosophy’. The aim of my thesis is to develop a more precise 
definition of philosophy, and so a more complete one will arise once from the completed thesis. This definition 
is merely meant as a starting point. As will become apparent in the course of this thesis, I aim to reject that 
philosophy can attain a universal understanding of the world, though it can aim at an abstract and fundamental 
one. 
14
 Assuming that universal traits of philosophy do exist, but more on this later. 
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 Chapter 1 
 
One way to see whether or not ubuntu succumbs to Mbembe’s criticism is to see how 
successful it is. This chapter tests ubuntu’s success, with the assumption that, if a concept is 
not successful, then it must have failed. For this reason, we should be clear on what is meant 
by being successful for a philosophical concept. On a superficial level, we can test a 
concept’s success by how much attention it has garnered from thinkers, academics and the 
general public. Ubuntu certainly does not fail on that level – at least within South Africa. But, 
arguably, a concept can be popular without being successful as a philosophical concept. I 
will therefore first develop a set of related criteria by which we can judge the success of 
philosophical concepts.  
First, a concept must be distinct from others. If it is not, then we are simply not 
dealing with an independent concept. Our test for its success could just as easily be done by 
testing another concept to which it is indistinct. If ubuntu is indistinct from other concepts, 
then we can automatically judge its success as a philosophical concept by looking at the other 
concepts. If ubuntu fails to be distinct from other, already familiar concepts in western 
philosophy, this naturally prevents South African philosophy from being successful as an 
independent tradition.  
Secondly, a concept must be used consistently. If different authors mean radically 
different things when they use the same word, we have good reason to believe that the word 
is either devoid of content (and is thus simply a stopgap for whichever ends or values are 
deemed desirable by common opinion) or that the authors themselves do not know what the 
word actually means. If we are unable to use the concept of ubuntu consistently, then there is 
a serious challenge to any claim that ubuntu is a successful philosophical concept.  
Thirdly, writers on the concept should display a meticulous concern for accuracy. 
This manifests itself in reflexive criticism generated within the debate with the aim of 
perfecting the understanding of the concept and of our relation to the concept. I believe that 
this is what Mbembe refers to when he says African philosophy has failed to be ‘deep’ (2002: 
240).  
Fourthly, the concept must be interesting. This criterion is somewhat difficult to 
explain, though I hope to give some explanation of it in Chapters 2 and 4 of my thesis. For 
now, let it suffice to say that a concept is interesting when it draws thinkers to investigate it.
15
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 I favour a naturalistic explanation of interestingness. Objects are primarily interesting because they are 
somehow relevant to our survival and flourishing. This does not mean that all philosophical concepts must have 
14 
 
If a concept is used consistently and distinctively, has a debate which is ‘deep’ and is 
judged to be interesting by several philosophers, then we can test it for the fifth criterion: 
sustainability. Successful philosophical concepts are those which have generated a sustained 
debate. I take it that criteria 1, 2, 3 and 4 are all necessary for there to be a sustained debate – 
but they are not sufficient. To find out whether or not a concept has generated a sustained 
debate is an empirical question: we need only to look at the discussion which has arisen and 
measure its duration and what has been covered in it. It is, as yet, still too early to tell whether 
or not ubuntu has generated a sustained debate. We can, however, make a judgement on 
whether or not the concept is sustainable. This judgement is speculative: does the concept at 
hand have the necessary features to give rise to a sustained debate? Here, we make a 
speculative judgement based on whether or not the concept has met the other four criteria. I 
take it that if a concept has displayed the first four criteria and has generated a sustained 
debate, we can say that it is a successful concept.  
 How then does ubuntu fare against these four criteria? 
 
‘What is Ubuntu?’: Ubuntu’s Failure as a Philosophical Concept 
To ask, ‘What is ubuntu?’ is a good entry point into this discussion. How we answer the 
question is a litmus test for whether or not ubuntu satisfies the first three criteria outlined 
above: distinctiveness, coherence and depth.  
In particular, our answer to this question should be able to show that ubuntu is 
successful as a philosophical concept. Is there such an answer in the literature? To start with, 
I discount answers to the question that succumb to the second worry mentioned above. These 
are unsuccessful for philosophical purposes because they present an answer which is 
unreflective. Similarly, quasi-religious answers to the question rely on an overly particular 
metaphysical basis which tends to be unexamined and highly problematic. Yet, even if we 
discount such answers, we run into problems.  
  
First Problem: The Problem of Collapsibility 
Let us start with The Problem of Collapsibility. This problem seems to indicate that ubuntu 
has failed to be distinct (criterion 1 of our success-test). It has already surfaced as the third 
worry in the Preliminary Remarks section of this thesis. Although I have argued that we 
should give African intellectuals the benefit of the doubt with regards to claims of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a directly discernible relation to practical application for them to be found interesting. Instead, they need only 
have features that indicate possible usefulness.  
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particularity, it may still be the case that ubuntu is nothing more than another name for a 
concept already familiar to Western Philosophy. So, while I argued that we should change 
our attitude towards ubuntu in the section on the third worry, it is still necessary to take into 
account that ubuntu is spoken of in a way that does little to mark it out as distinctive. In fact, 
many African intellectuals often speak of ubuntu in terms that assume an analogy with 
Western concepts. For some political philosophers and business ethicists, ubuntu appears to 
be nothing more than soft communitarianism (See for example Eze, 2008; Christians, 2004). 
For Cornell (2009), ubuntu is synonymous with dignity. For Archbishop Emeritus Desmond 
Tutu, ubuntu is Christian love expressed in the language of traditional African thought (cf. 
1999). For Ramose, ubuntu is inseparable from African religion and tradition, and drastically 
different to any western concepts (2003).
16
 There is even a possibility that ubuntu collapses 
into feminist ethics of care.
17
 If one were to view any one of these positions alone, it would 
appear that ubuntu is nothing new: it is simply a universal idea that has also managed to pitch 
up in Africa.  
The Problem of Collapsibility is perhaps the main reason the third worry mentioned 
above is often raised in discussions on ubuntu. We are so uncertain about the nature of 
ubuntu that we cannot differentiate between it and other values and philosophical systems. 
Only upon viewing the range of views as a whole does it become clear that ubuntu cannot 
simply be seen as an African ‘name’ for something already familiar to western philosophy. 
This is because the sheer difference in interpretation indicates an entirely autonomous entity 
which is merely assuming different guises for different people. So it seems prudent to assume 
that we are dealing with a concept for which we cannot yet find adequate terms to express it 
as a distinct idea. 
While it is reassuring to know that the literature as a whole indicates that ubuntu is 
autonomous, the fact that when we try to pin down exactly what it is it collapses into 
something else is very troublesome. If our answer to the question, ‘What is ubuntu?’ is the 
same as, for example, the answer to the question, ‘What is communitarianism?’, then ubuntu 
ceases to be philosophically interesting – it can only be interesting as an example of 
something already familiar to Western philosophy.
18
 The Problem of Collapsibility indicates 
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 Keevey (2009) appears to be of the same view. 
17
 Praeg, L., Postgraduate Seminar Course on Ubuntu, at the Department of International Studies and Political 
Science, Rhodes University, July to November 2011. 
18
 One potential (and productive) response to this particular version of the Problem of Collapsibility is to accept 
that ubuntu is communitarianism but is simultaneously distinct from Western conceptions of communitarianism 
because it is formed within a different debate. I find this response attractive but am dubious of its force. This 
response leaves open the possibility that ubuntu as a concept is no different in content to another concept 
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that ubuntu fails to meet the first criterion for a successful philosophical concept. Although 
this is enough evidence to show that ubuntu has failed as a philosophical concept, it is worth 
our time to consider another way in which ubuntu fails to satisfy the criteria for being a 
successful philosophy. 
 
Second Problem: The Lack of Scope 
The Problem of Collapsibility shows another problem plaguing the debate on ubuntu. The 
concept of ubuntu lacks scope. By scope, I mean an understanding of what the concept 
consists of and what it is able to do. When we survey the literature on ubuntu, we find that an 
inclusive definition of ubuntu can only be vague to a fault. The literature on ubuntu is 
scattered across many different disciplines, and lacks a unifying or distinguishing feature, 
such as a shared vision or shared aims. Indeed, in one brief review of the literature, I came 
across an anthropological ethno-philosophy,
19
 a Kantian-type deontological principle,
20
 a 
form of virtue ethics,
21
 a hermeneutic mystery,
22
 a theological Afro-Christian value,
23
 a 
customary law traditional interpretation of justice
24
 and a naïve approach to business ethics.
25
 
Within these approaches, there are fundamentally contradictory viewpoints about the nature 
of ubuntu. Some argue that ubuntu is a necessarily spiritual concept,
26
 others that it is 
compatible with our secular Constitution.
27
 For some, ubuntu is a principle radically 
incompatible with a ‘modern’ capitalist society;28 for others, it is a way to reform capitalist 
structures to be more efficient.
29
 And, of course, there is even debate as to who is able 
understand what ubuntu is (cf. Gade, 2012). The uncertainty is not superficial: it reveals that 
we have no practical or meaningful sense of what ubuntu is in any given situation. In our 
success-test, what I explain here indicates that ubuntu has failed to meet criterion 2: 
consistency.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
already familiar to Western philosophy – it is only its context which marks it as different. Further work needs to 
be done to show that the context significantly influences the content such that studying only the content of 
ubuntu is quite different to studying only the content of Western conceptions of communitarianism. 
19
 See Keevey (2009) and Ramose (2003). 
20
 See Metz (2007). 
21
 See Van Niekerk (2007). 
22
 See Praeg (2008) 
23
 See, for example, Tutu (1999) 
24
 See Cornell, D. (2008). 
25
 See Prinsloo, E.D. (1998) and Broodryk, J. (2005). I call these naïve because it attempts to portray 
communitarian ideals and contemporary capitalist business practice as potential bedfellows. 
26
 See Tutu (1999). 
27
 See Cornell (2008). 
28
 See Praeg (2008). 
29
 See Prinsloo (1998) and Broodryk (2005). 
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In philosophy there is usually some disagreement about what a concept is, and 
concepts are regularly used by different philosophical traditions and academic disciplines. It 
is this difference which drives philosophical discussion. Within rights discourse, for instance, 
the nature of human rights can be disputed on various levels and different traditions will 
explain human rights using different philosophical apparatuses. There is usually, however, a 
degree of consensus about what a concept is and/or what it can be used for. It is this 
consensus that I call the ‘scope’ of a concept. So, while we may disagree about the 
metaphysical basis for human rights, for instance, we mostly agree about their scope; that is, 
what role human rights should and can play in ethical discourse. When it comes to ubuntu, 
however, we struggle to be able to delineate a scope for it. The level of discord about the 
nature of ubuntu shows that it is currently a problematically uncertain philosophical concept. 
We do not even know, for instance, whether we can properly apply the idea to South African 
law (cf. Keevey, 2009).  
As we shall see, when Praeg (2008) himself approaches the concept of ubuntu, he 
finds that he can only ‘circumscribe’ it – that is, he can only give a rough outline of what 
ubuntu is, and this outline only refers to the context in which we find ourselves when we ask 
what ubuntu is. Praeg cannot define what ubuntu is at its core. Of course, such aporia is not 
itself problematic for a concept. As Praeg points out, a very similar situation was encountered 
by Socrates and Meno when attempting to define ‘virtue’ (2008: 382-383). But the 
uncertainty surrounding ubuntu is more pervasive than that surrounding virtue. Not only can 
we not provide a definition for ubuntu, but what we hold it to be is often contradictory in 
different situations. This may be symptomatic of any concept in the early stages of 
development, but it nevertheless shows that ubuntu is not yet successful. Despite Mokgoro’s 
claim to ‘recognise ubuntu when she sees it’ (1997: 2), a review of the literature on ubuntu as 
a whole reveals that South African philosophers and thinkers do not know what ubuntu is. 
This problematic uncertainty actually prevents sustained investigation into the concept of 
ubuntu – different discussants cannot, for the most part, meet their opposing camps in a 
constructive debate.  
 
Third Problem: The Lack of Depth 
There is yet a third problem which undermines the philosophical interest in the ubuntu 
debate. Most discussions on ubuntu lack ‘depth’, or sustained, self-reflective investigation 
into the concept (criterion 3). Mbembe (2002) identifies the same problem in African 
philosophy in general. He maintains that this is because African philosophy is subject to two 
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political trends: Nativism and Afro-Radicalism (Mbembe, 2002). I maintain that the same can 
be said about ubuntu. 
Nativism is a naïve appraisal of an idyllic Africa before it was tainted by the West. In 
this trend of thought, writers paint a utopian picture of African traditions and heritage, which, 
they tell us, should be uncritically re-assumed in order for us to solve all of today’s social 
problems. The other trend, Afro-Radicalism, sees the African as a Marxian proletariat 
fighting the imperialist capitalism of the West. Here, the African is painted as the perpetual 
victim of fate against which she must strive. In both trends, all problems, faults and worrying 
aspects of African identity and history are caused extraneously and are explicitly not the fault 
of any African agents. Both of these trends, Mbembe tells us, are not primarily motivated by 
an intellectual interest, but are rather responses to the violent oppression of the past. As such, 
they are political, concerned with power-relations and posturing. Therefore, neither trend is 
particularly concerned with accuracy or self-reflection – indeed, too much critical thought 
could render problematic the historical narratives which they use to justify their actions. 
Mbembe argues that both selectively portray history and human nature, excluding everything 
which does not support their grand narrative. While it is arguably important to respond 
meaningfully to the intellectual oppression of Africa, an uncritical adoption of some or other 
grand narrative with its selective view of humanity compromises the philosophical depth of 
debates.  
When we try to figure out why ubuntu is plagued by the problem of collapsibility and 
a lack of scope, I suggest that we should consider Mbembe’s critique as a good explanation 
for what has gone wrong in the development of ubuntu. It is precisely because ubuntu lacks 
depth as a concept that it can be used in ways that are prone to show the problem of 
collapsibility and a lack of scope. And, as I hope to show in what follows, it is because the 
philosophical project of ubuntu is subsumed by a more pervasive political project that it fails 
to show any depth. As I shall argue soon, ubuntu is subsumed by a sort of nativist project 
which tries to show ubuntu to be authentically African by claiming it can only be understood 
by traditional Africans. 
These three problems (the Problem of Collapsibility, the Lack of Scope and the Lack 
of Depth) reveal that our current answers to the question, ‘What is ubuntu?’ do not 
sufficiently show ubuntu to be philosophically successful. Ubuntu is generally not thought of 
as philosophically interesting outside of Africa, except for a few noteworthy philosophers.
30
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 See, for example, Bell, R. (2007); and Gade, C. (2010). 
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Many professional Western philosophers see ubuntu as just another version of humanism, for 
instance, echoing the Problem of Collapsibility. Currently, there is only one article on the 
otherwise comprehensive online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that mentions ubuntu: 
the entry on ‘Africana Philosophy’ (2010) contains exactly one line on ubuntu. There is a 
similar absence on ubuntu in most other respectable Western works on philosophy. This 
absence shows that the philosophical interest in ubuntu shown by South African intellectuals 
has failed to make a mark on the larger philosophical community. Yet, ubuntu has managed 
to do some astounding work in the areas of reconciliation (with the TRC), punishment (in the 
abolition of the death sentence
31
) and mediation of interests (as shown in PE municipality v. 
Various Occupiers
32
).
33
 South Africans and those acquainted with South Africa are able to 
identify that something extraordinary happened at these events and that ubuntu played an 
interesting role, even we seem unable to communicate this interestingness to other 
philosophical communities. So we need to ask ourselves why it that we have not managed to 
turn an interesting series of events and practices, even perhaps an interesting worldview, into 
a concept that is broadly recognised as philosophically successful. 
 
Why can’t we answer the question, ‘What is ubuntu?’: Praeg on Ubuntu 
Given our failure to show ubuntu to be a philosophically interesting concept, it is worthwhile 
considering an article which investigates why it is so difficult to answer the question, ‘What 
is ubuntu?’ Praeg does just this in his 2008 article, ‘What is [ubuntu]?’ Insofar as he answers 
the question, there are some well-known basics that he is able to give: ubuntu is a social ethic 
which stresses the importance of the community in an individual’s life. Praeg tells us that it is 
a characterised by a ‘logic of interdependence’ (2008), that according to ubuntu an individual 
must recognise his or her dependence on others in his or her action. This is similar to often 
repeated dictum: umntu ngumntu ngabantu.
34
 Yet, these basic descriptions hardly provide a 
definitive answer to the question, ‘What is ubuntu?’ Nothing about these statements marks 
ubuntu as a distinct from other communitarian ethics.  
Rather than attempting to show ubuntu to be particular to South Africa, Praeg’s 
‘circumscriptions’ detail the socio-political situation that prompts us to ask the question, 
‘What is ubuntu?’ And it is this socio-political situation which itself complicates answering 
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 S v Makwanyane and Another [1995] ZACC 3 at 151, 1995 (3) S.A. 391. 
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 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217. 
33
 Although it is possible to deconstruct the significance of ubuntu in aspects of all three of these instances (see, 
for example, Marx, C. 2002), when taken as a whole, it is difficult not to see the concept of ubuntu as playing 
some role in the formation of these extraordinary events. 
34
 Often translated as, ‘A person is/becomes a person through/by [other] people’. 
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the question. Praeg tells us that ubuntu is underscored by a series of tensions, which can all 
ultimately be understood as manifestations of ‘the tension between exaggerated and collapsed 
difference’ (2008: 370). In his paper, he identifies two of these manifestations: 1) the tension 
between the familiar and the unfamiliar (2008: 368) and 2) the tension between ‘a philosophy 
of interdependence’ and ‘a belief in our independence’ (2008: 272). It is important to note 
that the tension here is between the ‘performative’ principles35 (Praeg, 2008) and the actual 
content of ubuntu. In terms of its content, ubuntu stresses interconnectivity between people 
and warns against trying to be overly individualistic; yet the performative principles of our 
context push us to use ubuntu in our rhetoric to underscore Africa’s ‘modernity’, or its 
identity as an autonomous generator of intellectual and philosophical value (Praeg, 2008, 
370). Clearly, the performative principles of ubuntu’s context are at odds with its content. By 
becoming important specifically within the context of these performative principles, ubuntu’s 
identity is necessarily shaped by this tension. Yet, Praeg does not see ubuntu’s tension as 
necessarily undermining the concept’s philosophical value; rather it makes ubuntu much 
more interesting.
36
 For Praeg, ubuntu is not inherently distinct from other communitarian 
ethics – that is to say, its content does not differ from other familiar communitarian ethics; 
only its context marks it out as distinct.
37
 
I differ with Praeg on two important points. Firstly, I find that the tension he identifies 
that actually undermines ubuntu’s philosophical value. Secondly, I believe that ubuntu is 
distinct from other communitarian ethics in terms of content. In this chapter, I show how 
ubuntu’s philosophical value is undermined by a tension which I identify. Throughout the rest 
of my thesis, I will build case to show that ubuntu’s content is distinct from other 
communitarian ethics. Having said where I disagree with Praeg, I must state that I agree with 
him about the role of context. Ubuntu is notable as a philosophical concept because 
philosophers who invoke the concept do so conscious that it is responsive to ubuntu-praxis. 
Ubuntu-praxis, as lived philosophy, is necessary responsive to context. Context plays a 
crucial role in how ubuntu-praxis is expressed. One of the major problems that arise in the 
work of Metz, for example, is that his deontological expression of ubuntu appears out of 
touch with ubuntu’s context as a primarily ‘lived philosophy’.38 Of course, philosophy is not 
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 I take it that by ‘performative principles’, Praeg means the contingent political, social, economic and ethical 
demands placed on writers and thinkers, extraneous to the content of their writing. Performative principles take 
into account why a writer or thinker states something beyond the simple truth value of the statement. 
36
 Praeg, course on ubuntu, Rhodes University, 2011. 
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 Praeg, course on ubuntu, Rhodes University, 2011. 
38
 Mets is at pains to stress that his work is derived from distinctly African intuitions (2007). However, as I will 
discuss later in more detail in this thesis (see Chapter 3), I find that Ramose’s criticism of his work (and, more 
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merely an expression of context – this sort of intellectual activity is more of what we call 
anthropology. So there appears to be a fine line which the ubuntu philosophical project must 
walk in order to remain faithful to ubuntu-praxis and the practice of philosophy itself. I will 
explore how to walk this fine line later in my thesis, but for now let us focus on this context. 
 
My Version of the Tension that Undermines Ubuntu’s Philosophical Value 
As I have stated above, ubuntu has failed because of a tension generated between two 
performative principles. Although the tension which I identify here is roughly the same as 
Praeg’s, I mean to describe it in such a way that shows how it is fatal to the concept. Central 
to my tension is the concept of place: the tension arises because of the role that Africa as a 
place plays in the South African debate around ubuntu. I label my description of the tension: 
the untranslatability-philosophical value tension. Although ubuntu’s philosophical value 
nominally plays a role in the tension itself, we should be clear that both points in this tension 
are performative principles: what creates the tension here is not the difference between the 
content (performative principles) of ubuntu and its political constraints. Instead, there is a 
tension between two political constraints, and this tension undermines the actual 
philosophical value of ubuntu. Ironically, both performative principles arise out of a desire to 
show ubuntu to be philosophically valuable. Nevertheless, South African thinkers are not 
being substandard philosophers in allowing this tension to exist: these authors must be 
sensitive to the constraints placed on African philosophy by a history of intellectual 
oppression. Not paying attention to these constraints, as I have already said, would alienate 
their work from the very context that gives ubuntu its content and historical identity. So, we 
must keep in mind that it is impossible to get rid of the demands placed on ubuntu or to 
ignore them: they are necessary constraints given the structure of the debate. It is also 
important to note that these two constraints can be displayed by the same author. In fact, 
many authors often start by claiming that ubuntu is untranslatable before explaining that it 
has philosophical value.
39
 Some may tend to overstate one of these demands over another, but 
ultimately both must be present in any work that is to be relevant to the situation.  
 
More on Philosophical Value 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
particularly, of his method) hits the mark: Metz is looking for a Western-style deontological principle (Ramose, 
2007). 
39
 See, for example, Mokgoro (1998). 
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Before going further, I should give a basic set of criteria for philosophical value. Although I 
have already given a definition for philosophical success and I hold that it is by being 
successful that a concept reveals that it has philosophical value, philosophical value is a 
separate matter from philosophical success, although philosophical value is closely tied to 
philosophical success in that they share many of the same criteria. A concept has 
philosophical value when it allows for sustained debate, which in turn indicates that the 
concept is rich enough for further investigation, is potentially coherent and that it reveals 
something fundamental about the world and our relationship with it. The richness and 
sustainability of the debate on a concept depends on the potential for a fundamental 
understanding. It is generally held that a fundamental understanding of the world is one 
which is abstract. Naturally, abstraction is defined differently by different philosophers. Yet, 
most of us assume that abstraction has certain features. Primarily, most of us believe abstract 
concepts are not contingent. For example, ‘truth’ is an abstract concept that appears to be 
context-less. So, for now, let us assume that abstract concepts are non-contingent.  
My claim is that the tension created between the two politically motivated concerns 
mentioned above prevents the ubuntu-debate from being sustainable and coherent. It does so 
by undermining the potentially fundamental understanding that ubuntu could give us of our 
situation. This is because, as we shall see, we are driven to include ubuntu’s place of origin in 
the concept’s identity – what generally taken to be a contingent and irrelevant feature of a 
concept. In what follows, I unpack why we feel driven to include a contingent feature of 
ubuntu in our writing about it and how this drive undermines the philosophical value of 
ubuntu. 
 
Performative principle #1: The Need to Validate Ubuntu’s Philosophical Value 
Let us start with the philosophical value side of the tension. This demand manifests itself in 
the desire to assert that ubuntu is a philosophically valuable concept. Moreover, it is the 
assertion that ubuntu is an African concept of philosophical worth. Now, it is worthwhile 
noting that ubuntu may well be philosophically valuable by its own right. What I am 
highlighting here is the desire that ubuntu be shown to be philosophically valuable. The 
philosophical value demand arises out of the history of intellectual oppression in South 
Africa. Praeg explains: 
‘The question “What is ubuntu?” emerges in the enunciative space 
demarcated, on the one side, by the delegitimation of the colonial a priori 
and, on the other side, the ascending legitimation of the post-colonial a 
priori of self-determination. At stake here is the challenge to think Africa’s 
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modernity, more specifically, to understand the relation between the cultural 
(a quest for philosophy) and the political […]. I use the word ‘self-
determination’ holistically to include both the political principle of 
sovereignty and the cultural logic of authenticity.’ (Praeg, 2008, p. 370) 
  
Ubuntu has to succeed as an African philosophical concept for political reasons. Both Ramose 
(2002) and Mbembe (2002) tell how African philosophers must respond to the intellectual 
legacy of colonialism. Enlightenment thinkers – many of whom we remember for their 
positive contributions to western philosophy – played an important role in justifying the 
economic and social oppression of Africans. Mbembe traces the history of this back to 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, who questioned the rational, and thus human, nature of 
black Africans (2002: 246). Even once we (as Western-trained philosophers) moved on from 
such untenable positions, the legacy remained. Africa, it was believed, was intellectually 
inferior to Europe (Mbembe, 2002: 247). European settlers in Africa maintained that it was 
their responsibility to educate the black person and bring civilisation to the continent. One 
must remember that Apartheid, ‘Separate Development’, only made sense because it was 
understood that black Africans had yet to develop to the same level as Europeans. The 
political and economic oppression of black people had to be supported by the intellectual 
work of the time (Mbembe, 2002). As a result, in the body of works that we often look to as 
canon for western philosophy, there is also evident a system of intellectual subjugation. So 
African philosophers find themselves on the offensive. The philosophy as it is taught today in 
Africa stems from traditions that dismissed them qua Africans as inferior; and they must in 
some sense respond to the denials of their rationality found in the canon.  
The demands placed on ubuntu are very different to where Western philosophy finds 
itself today. The West experienced the intellectual deconstruction of essentialism in the latter 
half of the 20
th
 century. At least in Western academia today, it hardly makes sense to conflate 
rational capacity and place of origin or ‘race’. 40  However, African philosophers are not 
afforded the ability to deal with essentialist claims simply on an intellectual level. Ernst 
Cassirer puts forward a compelling argument that human beings are in fact symbolic animals 
rather than rational animals in his Essay on Man (1944). His argument appears especially 
pertinent for African philosophers who find themselves having to deal with a world 
constructed out of oppressive symbols that pervade every sphere of their lives, rather than 
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 ‘Race’ is placed in inverted comma because it has been shown to be a dubious classification of people. The 
reason why it is mentioned at all is because as construct it continues to play an important role in political 
discourse today. 
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simply an intellectual oppression.
41
 As a result, African philosophers find themselves having 
to respond
42
 by appealing to symbols: they need to find a token of their rational worth, or in 
Praeg’s words their ‘modernity’. On the face of it, ubuntu shows promise as just such a 
symbolic token. The success of ubuntu as a philosophical concept (if it can be used 
successfully) thus responds as a symbol that the denial of African intellectual worth was 
misguided.  
But this project is flawed. On the one hand, African philosophers need to point to a 
concept that is clearly philosophically valuable. On the other hand, however, they need the 
concept to be clearly African. As I have already said, abstraction is at the heart of our current 
conception of philosophical value. Praeg points out that part of the demand placed on ubuntu 
is that of ‘self-determination’ – the idea that Africa can generate its own intellectual and 
philosophical value. Part of the ubuntu philosophical project is to validate Africa as an 
autonomous generator of philosophical value. The project therefore assumes the importance 
of place itself. Abstraction, however, does not commonly allow for place to be important in 
the identity of a concept. Normally, we take ‘abstract’ not to include a concept’s place. For 
example, common abstract concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘beauty’ and ‘goodness’ are taken to exist 
independently of any instantiations of them.
43
 If ubuntu is abstract (and thus place-less) 
nothing ties it to Africa and it cannot validate Africa’s intellectual heritage. One reason why 
this is so troublesome is that is undermines the political demand to validate African 
autonomy. If we exclude place from the description of ubuntu, we are faced with the Problem 
of Collapsibility. This picture of ubuntu is one of ‘Johnny-come-lately’ and it hardly 
expresses the intellectual autonomy that African philosophy strives to display. So the desire to 
avoid the problems associated with abstraction and communicability, and the desire to 
conserve the role of Africa in the identity of ubuntu, leads to the ‘untranslatability’ claim. 
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 One should be careful at this point to note that it is not only African philosophers who need to make use of 
symbolic reasoning. As Cassirer stresses, all humans make use of symbolic reasoning. 
42
 One must ask: ‘Do African philosophers have to respond to the negative assertions of Western philosophers? 
Could they not plausibly create a philosophical tradition that does not respond to wrongful trends of thought in 
the international arena?’ While it is important to be critical of the perceived fact that the West sets the tone for 
discussions, one cannot deny the historical influence of the West on the rest of the world. Because of the 
colonial expansion of the previous centuries, national boundaries no longer limit the community with which one 
must interact – and so, African philosophers do not have the luxury of not taking part in the international debate. 
Furthermore, Biko points out that these negating assertions have become embedded in the black African 
consciousness (1978). It is necessary to show these assertions to be wrong so that black Africans can overcome 
the inferiority complex instilled in them by the recent history of oppression.  
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 One may argue that we can talk about abstraction without excluding the concept’s link to a place. While I 
agree with this, I find that it is not the standard conception of abstraction. Because it is not standard, it must be 
argued for – which is what this thesis does. 
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Performative Principle #2: the ‘Untranslatability’ Claim 
The ‘untranslatability’ concern usually amounts to some sort of claim that ubuntu has no 
cognates in non-Bantu languages. It is perhaps best exemplified by Yvonne Mokgoro’s 
famous statement: 
‘The concept ubuntu, like many African concepts, is not easily definable. To 
define an African notion in a foreign language and from an abstract as 
opposed to a concrete approach [is] to defy the very essence of the African 
world-view and can also be particularly elusive. […] In one’s own 
experience, ubuntu it seems, is one of those things that you recognise when 
you see it.’ (Mokgoro, 1997, p. 2) (Italics mine) 
 
One can find similar ‘untranslatability’ claims in the works of Ramose (2007), Tutu (1999) 
and Praeg (2008). Claims which embed ubuntu within certain spiritual frameworks, such as 
those by Ramose (2003), represent a similar attempt to assert ubuntu’s inaccessibility to 
outsiders. Mokgoro’s claim is particularly interesting because, not only does she claim that 
ubuntu is untranslatable, but she also claims that ubuntu is something that avoids abstract 
definition. Now, it is important to be clear, at this point I am neither accepting nor denying 
either of these claims. These two claims are interesting because they play a political role. That 
is, they reinforce ubuntu’s autochthony, or its African identity by claiming that it is obscure to 
outsiders. One way of interpreting these claims is they both deny that non-partisans of ubuntu 
culture can adequately understand or express the concept. If other cultures do not have a 
cognate for ubuntu and it cannot be communicated to them abstractly, then there can be no 
surer sign that it is truly African.  
This claim, however, fails to show that ubuntu is philosophically valuable. Translation 
and abstraction are the two processes that allow us to communicate a concept’s philosophical 
value to others. While the untranslatability claim assures ubuntu of its African identity, it 
obscures its philosophical value and ‘modernity’ (cf. Praeg, 2008) to the outside world. As a 
result, our assertions that ubuntu is philosophically valuable cannot be affirmed by external 
observers and our claims about our identity are left unvalidated by larger philosophical 
circles. More importantly, Africa’s response to the intellectual oppression of the past remains 
unheard, because it cannot be understood.  
 
In Summary 
African authors find themselves compelled, on one hand, to validate ubuntu as a symbol of 
African intellectuality and, on the other hand, to defend ubuntu’s African identity. These two 
‘performative principles’ hamstring the debate on ubuntu. While we cannot ignore them, they 
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prevent us from overcoming the three problems mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
This is primarily because we have been unable to incorporate the concept of place 
successfully in a concept’s identity without undermining its philosophical value. In order to 
do this, we cannot simply show that place is important for ubuntu alone. Rather, we must 
show that place plays a necessary role in the formation of philosophical concepts. In this way, 
we will be able to show that place is necessarily part of philosophical value. By reconciling 
place with philosophical value, we can start to produce philosophical work that is successful 
within the South African context. So, our task is first to reveal ubuntu’s potential for 
philosophical value which will, in turn, make it possible for there to be a consistent, deep, 
sustained debate on ubuntu. Bruce Janz offers us an attractive framework for allowing place 
to play an important role in the formulation of philosophy, which I will now explore.  
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 Chapter 2 
 
‘How can we best establish African Philosophy as truly African and truly 
philosophical?’  
–Bruce Janz, 2009, p. 26 
 
Dealing with the Philosophical Worth-Untranslatability Tension 
There are usually two interpretations of a tension. One could either view it as productive or as 
destructive. A productive tension challenges us to come up with creative responses to the two 
demands placed on us. It risks being untenable – that is, placing demands on us which we 
cannot fulfil; but proves not to be untenable after the creation of certain concepts. Creative 
tensions continue to exist once a solution to them has been created; it is their continued 
existence that allows for their solutions to remain pertinent and interesting. Consider, for 
instance, the tension between the value of the individual and the value of a community. Both 
place demands on us as ethical agents which can often be contradictory. Yet, these 
contradictory demands have led thinkers to develop various, and often interesting, systems of 
ethics. Despite these ethical systems, the conflicting demands placed on ethical agents by 
both the individual and the community perspectives remain. The best ethical systems can 
hope to do is provide us with a way of negotiating these demands.  
On the other hand, a destructive tension is one which is unavoidably untenable. There 
is no way to meet the demands placed on us by both conflicting elements of an untenable 
tension. Worse, an untenable tension undermines our ability to comprehend the world: if the 
tension cannot be solved then at least one element of our world is shown to be unavoidably 
chaotic and incomprehensible. The result of such a tension is that our ability to make sense of 
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our lives and their place in the world around us comes into question.
44
 Our response to an 
untenable tension should be to show either that it is in fact a productive tension by trying 
harder to find a creative solution or that that its presence is the result of faulty thinking at a 
more fundamental level.
45
 The question then is: Is our Philosophical Worth-Untranslatability 
Tension productive or destructive?  
It may be that we can develop useful responses to the tension outlined in Chapter 1, 
but we may not even have to do this. The Philosophical Worth-Untranslatability Tension 
bears at least one important feature that we ought to look for in Untenable Tensions: it is the 
result of faulty thinking. If this is the case, then regardless of how well we respond to the 
Tension, we cannot avoid the threat it poses us: that our ability to comprehend the world is 
fundamentally flawed. My argument that this tension is an Untenable Tension will take the 
form of an alternative explanation of South African philosophy in which the Untranslatability 
Claim does not need to be made. The aim is to show that we can preserve and validate the 
identity of South African Philosophy without resorting to any conflicting claims. Because this 
project looks at the conditions in which the tension arises, and because these conditions are 
constitutive of philosophy itself, my claim is that the faulty thinking that gives rise to the 
Tension lies in how we conceive of philosophy.  
Most philosophers have an uncritical view of philosophy itself
46
: even when we 
examine the nature of our arguments and assertions, we take certain things for granted. 
Crucially for our current project, philosophers today have a universalistic conception of 
philosophy. This is not to rule out that many philosophers are moral or epistemic relativists. 
Rather, it is the assertion that most philosophers assume that the form of critical reasoning is 
contingent on nothing except, perhaps, human nature. In its non-relativistic form, this claim 
gives rise to the tension outlined in Chapter 1 by denying that anything that marks ubuntu as 
particularly African is really worthy of philosophical investigation – thus undermining its 
African identity. A similar claim could be made by a relativist – one which assumes that 
human nature is just such that it allows for various different articulations of reason which 
may or may not be accessible to others. The relativistic interpretation of the universalistic 
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 For the purposes of this thesis, I am assuming that a fundamental criterion for a good life is the ability, at least 
in theory, to make sense of our lives, the world and the relationship between the two. 
45
 There remains, of course, the possibility that we have an unavoidable untenable tension. In this case, we are 
faced with a significant existential challenge, and possibly even unavoidable defeat. In this case, I believe, after 
we have tried all methods of showing the tension to actually be avoidable, we would most probably have to 
resort to self-deception or to intellectual hopelessness, where we give up trying to understand the world. 
46
 I take it that philosophers are by training critical of all things brought to their attention. However, not all 
philosophers spend significant amounts of time analysing philosophy itself. Rather, in order to do philosophy, 
they must simply take certain things about it for granted. 
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claim undermines any communication of philosophical value found in the concept to other 
people groups; this is a similar move to the untranslatability claim. Of course, I have only 
briefly sketched each of these positions, but I use these sketches to illustrate the type of 
positions that would give rise to the Philosophical Worth-Untranslatability Tension. 
Symptomatic of this position is the undervaluation of the role of place in philosophy. 
Why place? The tension we are discussing is at heart an engagement with place. As I 
have already said, part of European domination in Africa was the continual dismissal of 
Africa as a place for philosophy. Although the West has, in some sense, moved beyond the 
essentialism found in this judgement, the dismissal itself marks African philosophy’s 
birthplace. As I hope to show, it is an unavoidable feature of African philosophy that it must 
respond to the dismissal of its philosophical worth. The tension arises as a result of the 
dismissal, first, of a particular place (Africa), and later of place in general as the locus of 
philosophy.
47
 To argue my point, I will use the conceptual tools developed by a philosopher 
who has done much to explain philosophy systematically in terms of place: Bruce Janz. 
 
A Contrary View: Philosophy as Contingent on Place 
‘The essentialist, spatializing question, levelled by Western philosophy 
and adopted by many African philosophers, has been ‘What is African 
philosophy?’, which amounts to ‘Does African philosophy have a right to 
exist?’ (Janz, 2004c:107) 
 
The Canadian philosopher Janz maintains that thinkers have approached African philosophy 
from a generally unhelpful and historically oppressive set of assumptions. Janz maintains that 
the current questions we ask about African philosophy are primarily metaphysical in nature; 
that is, they look for some essentialist criteria for determining whether a project belongs in 
the corpus of African philosophy(2009:3-4). In other words, we have been trying to define 
what African philosophy is. The problem with a metaphysical approach is that the overall 
project of validating African philosophy becomes an essentialist one. When we ask, ‘What is 
African Philosophy?’ or, ‘What makes a project uniquely African?’ we assume that there 
exist necessary and sufficient conditions that mark certain philosophical projects as African. 
Of course, when we fail to find such conditions, the distinctiveness of African philosophy 
fades. Yet, to deny the distinctiveness not only of African philosophy, but of all traditions of 
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 It is an irony that Janz picks up on, that when western philosophy assumed the role of place in philosophy, it 
denied Africa as a locus of philosophy, but later when Africa was able to respond intellectually, the west had 
moved to a universalistic view of philosophy (2009:233).  
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philosophy, does not match up with lived experience: namely that we are plausibly able to 
distinguish different traditions of philosophy based on substantive features of these traditions. 
Furthermore, any essentialist definition of ‘philosophy’ assumes an uncritical stasis. If, for 
example, African philosophy is essentially philosophy that uses ‘emotional reasoning’, then 
any philosopher who questions the role of emotions in reasoning is automatically excluded as 
an African philosopher. Yet philosophy is precisely that which questions everything, 
including its own foundations – it is bound to question any essentialist definition of itself. So 
no essentialist definition of any tradition of philosophy can accurately describe what that 
tradition is. 
Janz tries a different tack. He situates the problem as a ‘phenomenological 
hermeneutic’ one (2004c: 110; 2007: 690; 2009: 145). Instead of asking for necessary and 
sufficient conditions for determining whether a project is African or not, Janz asks, ‘What is 
it to do philosophy in this (Africa) place?’ (2004c: 110; 2009: 7). African philosophy 
becomes that which falls within a conversation about an African place. This does not 
preclude asking metaphysical questions about African philosophy, but it does preclude taking 
them to be the first questions we ought to ask about African philosophy. By extension, Janz’s 
approach applies to all philosophical projects. We could similarly ask, ‘What makes Analytic 
(as opposed to Continental) Philosophy?’ But this question would be misleading. Rather, we 
ought to ask, ‘What conversation gave rise to Analytic Philosophy?’ – a question which looks 
at the place which made Analytic philosophy relevant to a specific group of people. Janz’s 
call then is for us to do philosophy within a tradition, instead of dispassionately regarding the 
tradition from without.  
To explain his approach to philosophy, Janz coins the concept ‘philosophy-in-place’. 
Janz best explains this concept in the opening and closing chapters of his book, Philosophy in 
an African Place (2009), though it informs almost all of his work for the past decade or so. 
Philosophy-in-place is especially sensitive to the contingency of all philosophy on the 
context, or place, to which it responds. Janz holds that all philosophy is done as a response to 
place, but not all philosophical projects acknowledge this dependence. It is therefore possible 
for philosophy to be done in bad faith.
48
 Philosophy-in-place is philosophy done in good 
faith: that is, it is cognisant of the role of place in determining the starting points of 
philosophical projects but does not see place as determining the entire scope of philosophy. 
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 I use the term ‘bad faith’ here in a sense that Jean-Paul Sartre would have endorsed. There is a noteworthy 
similarity between doing philosophy in a way that is ignorant of its dependence on place and the subject who 
denies the role of her context in determining the type of person she is and the range of choices available to her.  
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Janz is quite clear that philosophy-in-place is not the claim that philosophy is nothing more 
than place itself, nor is it a deterministic conception of philosophy (2009: 6). Rather, to use a 
metaphor from art, place provides the media and subject matter for a painting, though it does 
not dictate the final shape and quality of that painting. Both media and subject matter can 
only fit within in a certain range of interpretations – and they often favour some 
interpretations over others. Similarly, different places lend themselves to different 
interpretations, and there are some types of interpretations that would be entirely alien to a 
place,
49
 but knowing as much does not amount to philosophical determinism.  
Put another way, philosophy-in-place is the view that all philosophy ‘has contingent 
but not arbitrary interests’ (Janz, 2009:2). A favourable reading of this statement is that the 
only way an interest can gain the fundamental importance that we ascribe to philosophy is if 
it relates to our place in a fundamental way. It follows then that all fundamental interests are 
contingent on place – though, by no means unimportant. Philosophy-in-place is not a 
predictive model of philosophy. A predictive model attempts to tell us, given a set of factors, 
what sort of philosophy we might expect in a certain place. Rather, we should understand it 
as a descriptive model which attempts to find a connection between a current state of affairs 
and the place which gives rise to them. By being aware of these connections, and the 
contingency of their interests, philosophers in place are in a better place to produce relevant 
work and to evaluate the state of the current body of philosophical work. 
The main problem Janz finds in African philosophy is that, because of the 
conversation it finds itself in, it finds itself having to defend its difference to a dismissive and 
historically hostile outsider (2004c: 107; 2007; 2009: 7). The untenable tension of Chapter 1 
is the result of trying to look for an essential quality of African philosophy, exemplified in 
ubuntu. When we ask, ‘How can we best establish African Philosophy as truly African and 
truly philosophical?’ (2009: 26), we are looking for essential markers of both philosophical 
thought and of African identity. The untranslatability claim comes as an attempt to prevent 
any critical breakdown of ostensibly essential characteristics – at the cost of true 
philosophical practice. If, however, we grant that ubuntu is African for no other reason than it 
plays a prominent role in an African conversation, we are already part of the way to avoiding 
the untenable tension. We still need to show that ubuntu does not, apart from its being 
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 Just because certain questions and interpretations of a place are alien to it, it does not mean that we should not 
ask such questions about a place. Quite often, these sorts of questions can produce insightful results – something 
which Janz explores in a 2012 paper, ‘Migrating Texts’. However, we need to be sensitive to the fact that these 
questions are alien and that they do not lend themselves to an understanding of a place that those within that 
place would have. Quite often, the interaction between alien questions and a place is more revealing of the place 
of the subject asking the questions than of the place of which the questions are now being asked.  
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situated within an African conversation, collapse into other already familiar concepts. 
Fortunately, Janz’s phenomenological hermeneutic approach promises to show how a 
concept can be substantively distinctive because of its relationship to its place. 
For Janz, a distinguishing characteristic of philosophy is that it creates concepts 
(2011: 178). Concepts are created in order to respond to the (productive) tensions of a place. 
Now, concepts themselves are not philosophy; Janz compares concepts to the markings of 
wolves (2011: 175). The concepts we find in philosophical writings indicate that philosophy 
‘has been here’, or that there has been critical reflection about this place in particular. The 
philosophy itself occurred when the thinker tried to make sense of her place, and the concepts 
came about because of this interaction between thinker and place. Because each place is 
different, concepts must be tailor-made to respond to the distinctive tensions of that place. 
When, for example, Janz compares Feminist and African philosophical writers, he finds that 
there are many similarities between the two traditions: both have had to deal extensively with 
the concept of emancipation (among others) (2011:181-182). But, this concept is understood 
differently by each tradition – it has had to respond to different tensions and has had to be 
defined differently to suit these particular tensions. As Janz puts it, each concept has a 
different ‘provenance’ – that is a different (hi)story of usage or a different track record. As a 
result, the concept of emancipation in Feminism bears only superficial similarities to the 
same word in African philosophy, but an African philosopher speaking to a feminist 
philosopher would soon find that they are using different concepts. So ubuntu may bear 
superficial similarities to other concepts from other philosophical traditions, but because it 
has (had) to respond to a distinctive place with its own set of tensions, it is substantively 
distinct from these other concepts.
50
  
Janz’s philosophy-in-place gives us a way out of the untenable tension undermining 
ubuntu and promises to show ubuntu to be substantively different from other, similar 
concepts. I hope to provide a better explanation of how he does this by examining his concept 
of place in what follows. But I must make two notes about his philosophy-in-place before I 
do so. The first is that we cannot apply Janz’s concept of philosophy-in-place only in an 
isolated case. Janz holds that all philosophy is done in response to place, though not all 
writers may be conscious of this. If we adopt the concept of philosophy-in-place to help us 
overcome a problem with ubuntu, we must do so for our whole picture of philosophy. So, 
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 I put ‘had’ in brackets because I believe we have not yet really applied ubuntu to most of the fundamental 
tensions and problems in the South African place. Not doing so is part of the reason why we do not seem to be 
able to talk about ubuntu in any substantive way. In the next chapter, I will outline some of these tensions and 
problems and propose ways in which we might view ubuntu as a solution to them. 
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despite my focus on ubuntu, what I suggest here has repercussions for all philosophy, 
especially in South Africa.  
Secondly, Janz explicitly tells us that philosophy-in-place does not amount to a 
hermeneutics of suspicion (2009: 2). A hermeneutics of suspicion is used to undermine a 
philosophical writing’s (or all philosophical writings’) pretence to providing a universal or 
fundamental understanding. For example, Nietzsche notably posited the Will to Power as the 
true reason behind many religious and philosophical writings advocating a certain type of 
morality. He used his hermeneutic of suspicion to cast doubt over the universality or 
fundamentality of the moral system advocated by these writers. Janz does not mean to cast 
doubt over philosophical projects. Instead, as I have said, he aims to explain how these 
projects are in fact fundamental while guarding an experienced, real difference between them. 
Doing philosophy-in-place means taking the expressed concerns that gave rise to 
philosophical project seriously (though, it does not mean taking them uncritically).  
What, then, is place? And how does it give rise to philosophy? In the following 
section I will consider Janz’s answers to these questions and propose several additions to his 
work. 
 
Unpacking Philosophy-in-Place: What is place? 
Place is a well-explored concept in other disciplines. Disciplines such as geography, literature 
studies and anthropology have all developed a systematic account of place, partially due to a 
greater conscience of the influence of place on their disciplines. Each of these 
systematisations of place is suited to its discipline (Janz, 2009: 11). Philosophy, as I have 
already said, has generally been thought of as unbound by place. As a result, there are not 
many philosophers that develop a systematic account of place. Janz attempts to remedy this 
by considering as many systematic accounts of place as he has come across in various fields. 
There is not enough space here to consider place in as much detail as Janz does, and to do so 
in one chapter would be disorientating. Fortunately, Janz’s investigation of place has been 
developed into a systematic account. I am going to present his account of place through three 
examples. By providing concrete anchoring points, I hope to avoid the confusion and 
ambiguity that often arises from an encyclopaedic account, such as Janz’s which draws on so 
many different sources. For sake clarity, let us consider the first to examples to be concerned 
with phenomenology (‘What is place like?’), and the last one with hermeneutics (‘How is 
place meaningful?). As will become clear, this distinction is purely heuristic, and these two 
aspects of place are unavoidably interrelated. 
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1
st
 Example: The Aikido Dojo 
The first example of place has nothing to do with ubuntu or African philosophy in particular. 
I use it because it highlights several important general aspects of place – though it provides 
an interesting platform for considering more complex aspects of place.
51
 Rhodes University’s 
oldest martial arts club is the aikido club. It was founded in 1986 and the current Sensei 
(instructor) was among the first students in this club. As a traditional Japanese martial art, 
aikido is practised in a dojo. The dojo is created and treated along traditional Japanese 
customs. The training area is demarcated by tatami or floor mats.
52
 Opposite the entrance to 
the dojo is the shomen, or front of the room. On the shomen side of the room, there is the 
kamiza. The kamiza is a traditional Japanese display piece, usually with a picture of the 
founder of the martial art or calligraphy, and several training weapons. Now, the Rhodes 
Aikido Club shares the room it uses for its dojo with two other martial art codes, and has to 
put together and take down its own dojo in this room every time there is a practice session. 
Apart from setting up the room in a particular way, the place of the aikido dojo is created 
through several practices. Upon entering the dojo room, all aikikai (aikido practitioners) rei, 
or bow, towards the shomen. They rei again when they step onto the mat. Before the class 
starts, the aikikai always sit in seiza (kneeling position) and wait for the Sensei. When the 
Sensei wishes to start the class, he first reis to the shomen and again to the aikikai. This 
happens again at the end of a practice session. All formal greetings, instructions and other 
etiquette words are in Japanese. Similarly, the students are all required to wear gi or white 
training clothes. The Sensei and other black belt practitioners wear a hakama (black skirt 
traditionally worn by samurai) over their gi. Aikikai are discouraged from wearing their gear 
outside the dojo. All of these practices (and countless other smaller ones) go into creating a 
specific place: one where a person may, and is expected to, do a controlled form of violence 
to another. 
In the dojo, one sees the keen interplay between subject and place. According to Janz, 
place is a component of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the milieu. 
‘One might take his [Merleau-Ponty’s] notion of embodied knowledge as 
requiring a sense of place for fulfillment. The two together, along with any 
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 In particular, this example is an excellent example of how places can migrate and be replicated in other 
places. For a theoretical discussion of migration of text (and implicitly concepts) see Janz, B. ‘Philosophy-in-
Place and Texts Out of Place’, in William Sweet (ed.) Migrating Texts and Traditions. Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa Press, 2012. pp 287-303. 
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 Traditional tatami are made from pressed grass covered in canvass, though the Rhodes University ones are 
foam rubber. 
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mediating devices (such as technology) that make the connection between 
body and place possible, we will call “milieu”.’ (Janz, 2009: 8) 
Merleau-Ponty was a proponent of embodied cognition which maintains that cognitive 
processes (including knowledge) are shaped by their physical context (Cowart, 2005). The 
ways in which the subject expresses herself, what she knows and understands and all her 
avenues for action are partially determined by her environment. This environment is a 
meaning-laden place, and not simply a geographical location. So the subject is formed by her 
place. The subject, mediated by place, and what she finds valuable and meaningful in her 
surroundings constitute her milieu. The milieu, from the subject’s perspective, is a place to 
which she must respond in a particular way. Her knowledge of how to act is dependent on, 
and made possible by, the place. In the dojo, an aikikai is embodied knowledge: she observes 
the rules, etiquette and aims of the training space, and is only an aikikai to the extent that she 
does so. So the dojo as milieu for the aikikai is made up of the shomen (to which she must 
rei), the sensei (to whom she must defer), other aikikai (with whom she must train hard but 
without causing injury) and the tatami (on which she may train, under certain conditions). For 
the sensei, the dojo as milieu consists of aikikai (which he must instruct), as well as other 
elements which he may view differently to his students. Both sensei and aikikai embody 
knowledge differently but they are responding to the same place. Their milieus, or how the 
place appears to them, are slightly different, but recognise the same place. Janz cites Malpas, 
who holds that place is the ‘basis for agency’ (Janz, 2009: 12). All particularities that make a 
particular subject who she is, and that provide her with the raw material on which she is to 
work her agency, are found in place. Without place, one has only an abstract subject for 
whom everything is possible and therefore nothing is definite – a subject whom we can say 
nothing about. As Janz puts it, ‘To be human is to be in a place’ (2009: 11). 
But we should not understand it simply that place forms the subject. Subjects create 
places. When considering at what level places become meaningful, Janz tellingly considers 
the individual as the potentially smallest meaningful place (2009: 13), revealing that the 
subject herself is the centre around which a place is constituted. Of course, places are 
accessible by more than one person – an intuition that African philosophy takes to be very 
important – and it may be more useful to consider them as intersubjective, rather than 
subjective entities. But the point remains: places are subject-dependent. What makes a place a 
place is that it is meaningful to a subject. ‘Our places have as much to with the narratives, 
histories and practices we attach to them as with the geographical features’ (Janz, 2009: 22). 
Places are partially constituted by social roles and practices; when these social roles and 
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practices are disrupted, we get a sense of ‘placelessness’ (Janz, 2009: 17). Janz explains that a 
place is formed by practices that we associate with that place: for example, a street is just that 
which we continually walk and drive along (Janz, 2009: 22). So the dojo as a place becomes 
just such a place precisely because of the way the aikikai and their sensei treat it: in short, an 
aikido dojo is the place where aikido is practiced. As I have mentioned, the Rhodes dojo is 
shared with several other martial arts clubs. When they use it, it is no longer an aikido dojo, 
but it becomes a different place. The aikido dojo is delineated by our actions (practices, 
etiquette, training drills) within that place. Where we sit when we rei, the direction that we 
rei, how we treat other aikikai, the actions we refrain from and the language we use, all 
determine the specific set of human and spatial relationships that make a dojo. Similarly, all 
other places are the product of human action. What makes a town, a country, a region, a 
home or a place of worship is the repetitive and continual set of behaviours and social roles 
that occur in those places.  
Events that disrupt these social roles, disrupt the place and reshape it. After such 
events, such as war or revolution, a new set of practices arise as response to the disruption 
and a new place begins to be formed. There is, therefore, a constant interplay between subject 
and place: subject and place create each other dialectically (Janz, 2009: 8, 15). This is not to 
say that subjects are free to create whichever place they desire. Places are ‘viscous’ (Janz, 
2009: 217, 2011: 174). That is to say, places retain something of their previous formulations. 
I will return to this aspect of place in the next example. For now, all that I need to stress is 
that the subject must change a place incrementally, and in doing so she changes something of 
her own subjectivity.  
Along which lines does the subject interact with a place to form a milieu? Janz 
suggests that we form our milieu around the questions of, ‘“What we are loyal to,” “what we 
care about,” or “what matters”’ (2009: 17). Place then is a value-laden landscape, where the 
subject identifies features that are important to herself. Conversely, there are also features of 
certain places that a subject would not notice. When we describe a place, it becomes 
important to pay attention to what subjects in that place take to matter – and what features 
they do not notice. Subjects identify what matters in a place through a memory of previous 
interactions with the place at hand and other places. From this, we can see that the particular 
starting point of a place is far less important than continuity between previous formulations of 
a place and our current one. Within the Rhodes aikido dojo, certain areas gain a specific 
importance to aikikai. The shomen is one such area. By the aikikai’s actions she designates 
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this area of the dojo as having a specific importance.
53
 In the case of the dojo, what matters 
about the shomen is somewhat arbitrary – there is nothing that makes a shomen meaningful 
except that aikikai have agreed to treat it as such. This is not to say that all meaningful 
features of any given place are arbitrary or merely the result of some agreement. Rather, the 
point is that places are constructed out of a set of meaningful features which subjects interact 
with in such a way that shows them to be meaningful. What identifies a subject as being in 
place is that she is able to identify these features as meaningful.  
As I have said, when the practices which constitute a place are disrupted, we get a 
sense of ‘placelessness’. Disruption may come in the form of war, invasion, catastrophic 
natural events and other immensely violent events; but it can also come with the passage of 
time (such as when one revisits a hometown several decades after leaving it), or when one 
encounters subjects who are not familiar with a place. When the subject sees a place as 
placeless, that place becomes chaotic, meaningless or even threatening. For the aikikai, the 
dojo during another training session is meaningless; the symbolic features of the dojo that she 
recognised in her own training place are not present in this one, and she does not know how 
to respond. A more extreme case of this is a country that has been invaded. Janz uses the 
example of Africa during colonisation and the exodus of African slaves to illustrate 
placelessness (2009: 225-226). The Africans in these places experienced a violent and often 
pervasive disruption of the behaviours which constituted their places. They felt a disconnect 
between the place they were currently in and the place they once knew. The latter was the one 
in which they had embodied knowledge and were acquainted with as a milieu. The disrupted 
place of colonised Africa was one which Africans did not know how to navigate at first, and 
which continued to be threatening to them. Janz calls the violent manner in which these 
subjects have been made to feel placeless ‘alienation’ (2009: 226). 
Janz suggests that a sense of placelessness and alienation needs to be overcome by 
‘re-presenting’ the place (2009: 17). By situating the new, ‘post-disruption’ place within a 
narrative, subjects reassert their ability to identify those features of their place that are 
meaningful to them (thus also reconstructing their milieu). Janz is careful to make it clear that 
we cannot re-appropriate our place by simply analysing and observing it (2009: 17). As it is 
part of our embodied knowledge and is constituted by our actions, we need to re-enact it 
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 Aikikai treat the shomen with respect. I have already mentioned that all aikikai and their sensei will rei to the 
shomen at the beginning and end of class. On top of this, it is imperative that the sensei stand between the 
aikikai and the shomen when he instructs, so that the aikikai face the shomen while being instructed. Aikikai are 
instructed not to turn their backs to the shomen if they can help it during practice sessions. These and a few 
other points of etiquette designate the shomen as a meaningful area within the place of the dojo.  
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(Janz, 2009: 17). Yet, by retelling and reformulating our place, we in fact change our place. 
The texts which we use to ‘re-present’ our place become part of our place, changing its 
meaning. Janz writes, ‘ideas come from places, and at the same time are constitutive of those 
places’ (2012: 297-298, my own italics). Place then is never static, but changes whenever we 
attempt to create or sustain it. Philosophy-in-place is a practice
54
 which enacts a place. By 
doing philosophy-in-place, we designate the important features of a place as we continually 
return to them as features worthy of our attention. 
The dojo, and all other places, is dependent on the presence of a subject that can read 
it in a particular way; this points to the fact that places are also dependent on time (Janz, 
2009: 9). The same geographical location where the place of the Rhodes aikido dojo exists at 
certain times in the week becomes other places during other training sessions, and to other 
subjects. 200 years ago, the geographical location where the dojo currently stands was an 
entirely different place, and it will be an entirely different place 200 years in the future. Thus, 
the dojo is bound to flicker in and out of existence, only when certain people are present in it 
(Janz, 2004a: 87). Gilles Deleuze writes, ‘the only subjectivity is time’ (2005: 80). While this 
statement might be wrong in its absoluteness, it points to the inextricable relationship 
between the subject and time. If place is dependent on the subject, it follows that it exists 
within time. Janz notes that Heidegger was sensitive to the relationship between time and 
place, especially since he moved his focus from time to place as a basis for subjectivity 
(2009: 6). To better explore the relationship between place and time, let us consider the 
second example of place: the old border post into the former Transkei Bantustan. 
 
2
nd
 Example: The Old Border Post 
The Apartheid government set up Bantustans as reserves where black Africans had to live 
unless employed by the white-owned economy. By ensuring that Bantustans were small and 
had very few resources, the then Government was able to make sure that black people would 
be forced to find work in the white-dominated urban centres of South Africa. The Apartheid 
government ostensibly aimed at giving Bantustans a form of independence under the guise of 
‘separate development’. This independence was nevertheless nothing more than a façade as 
leaders of these Bantustans were South African state employees. Four Bantustans actually 
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lend itself towards instructing a musician to play music (cf. Janz, 2012: 290).  
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attained a nominal independence: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. The 
Transkei is located just north of East London, with some coastal access but no viable ports. 
With the declaration of independence in 1976, all amaXhosa residents of the Transkei lost 
their South African citizenship and were treated as foreign nationals by the South African 
Government. Because the Transkei was nominally independent, a border post was set up on 
the N2 highway that links Cape Town to Durban, to regulate the movement of people. 
Although white people would have had to report to the border post, it was well understood 
that the post was there more to keep black South Africans in than to keep white South 
Africans out. The building where this border post is remains today, as a coffee shop and 
padstal.
55
  
Although Janz, following Marc Augé, remarks that airports and other places of transit 
are something of a ‘non-place’56 (2004b), there are good reasons to examine this border post 
as a place. ‘Place is space invested with symbolic meaning, and that meaning becomes 
inscribed in a variety of ways, ranging from highly codified or ritualized ways to very 
fleeting ways’ (Janz, 2009: 22). The border post into the former Transkei is itself a symbol of 
the devastating bureaucratic machinery that enforced Apartheid in South Africa. As 
Apartheid was a formative historic period, the border post provides an excellent example of 
place’s interaction with time. Janz mentions two temporal features of time: provenance and 
trace. Let us explore each of these in turn with reference to the border post. 
Concepts, like wines, have a provenance (Janz, 2011: 177). To say this is to admit that 
concepts were developed in response to a particular place. But concepts, like texts, can 
migrate, and when they do, they change the place to which they have migrated (Janz, 2012). 
To ask what the provenance of a place is, is to ask from whence come the concepts and 
practices that have been inscribed on that place, or that have formed that place (Janz, 2011: 
177). We must be careful here: provenance is not the same as ‘origin’ (Janz, 2011: 174). 
Questions about origins often bring with them a sense of cultural purity, and can be grounds 
for rejecting concepts and places as allochthonous, or foreign. Cultural purity does not admit 
that places change over time and that they interact with each other, leaving the concept of 
cultural purity at best hopelessly unable to describe the actual state of the world and at worst 
xenophobic. Provenance is rather concerned with the entire passage of a concept. When we 
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 Airport terminals, according to Marc Augé (1995), are constructed out of symbols which all reference other 
places. They are thus places whose sole purpose is to get us to another place, and therefore not a place one can 
dwell in. 
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ask the provenance of a concept, we ask where it has been and how each place it has been has 
changed it. In this way, it is similar to Geuss’s description of Nietzsche’s genealogy (1999).  
The Transkei border post has an interesting provenance insofar as it represents a 
major theme in South African history. Border posts as a concept come from the rise of 
nationalism in Europe. Where border posts have been built, they have been a way for humans 
to inscribe on a place the concepts and ideals of nationalism. So the Transkei border post 
points back to the invasion of European ideologies in Africa. As another step in this 
genealogy, the border post also in a sense came from Apartheid as a nationalist ideology, 
which itself modified and added to the nationalism(s) present in Europe. Notable among its 
addition, was the insistence that ‘nationhood’ be determined along ‘tribal’ lines and its 
enforcement thereof through a policy of Separate Development. On a more local level, it calls 
to mind the first instance of a racially defined border in what has since become South Africa. 
When Jan van Riebeeck landed in the Cape in 1652, he erected a hedge in present-day 
Kirstenbosch to separate ‘white’ Cape Town from the ‘black’ rest of Africa. With this hedge, 
he and the Dutch East Indian Company took possession of the Cape in true European fashion 
– with a border, a flag and state bureaucratic machinery. The reason for this separation was to 
legitimate the exploitation of Africa, by creating a national as well as racial Other in 
Africans. The bureaucratic machinery, the presence of State flags and arbitrary border line at 
the Transkei border post arise out of a genealogy which included Van Riebeeck’s hedge. 
And, although many of the amaXhosa in the Transkei may not have been aware of the hedge 
in Kirstenbosch, they were certainly aware of the role that these apparatuses played in 
legitimating their exploitation. Through its provenance, the border post came to represent 
oppression to the amaXhosa in the Transkei. 
But provenance is not only backward-looking (Janz, 2009: 18). The provenance of a 
place captures the sense that all places symbolically represent the passage of time, including 
the present and the future. The Transkei border post has since become a coffee shop and has 
fallen into disrepair. There are visible marks of the passage of time on the place. In its 
disrepair, it represents the continued present state of poverty in the region. The lack of repair 
points to a despair about the future. So present in the same place are clues about people’s 
relationship with past, present and future. 
Places can be understood as narratives. Janz talks about tradition as a form of place, 
one which is best viewed set of meaningful symbols or a narrative (2004c: 114). For 
understanding how place displays the passage of time, it may useful to investigate how we 
see places as narratives. Narratives presuppose time and thus embody the provenance of a 
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place. Even when things recur, they do so over a period of time. Janz talks about places being 
organised by topoi (2009: 223). Topoi are recurring themes in literature: for example, the 
‘fallen hero’ or the ‘plaasroman’.57 A productive way of viewing place is that the symbols 
inherent in a place are arranged according to topoi – that is, symbols in a place tell a story 
about that place. The Transkei border post is a symbolically rich structure; it embodies 
several topoi. For instance, one topos that we have already discussed is that of segregation to 
justify exploitation. Another would be the topos of an oppressive government: the Apartheid 
government created the building in order to subjugate a people group – the hostility of the 
people working there and of the bureaucratic system it dispensed, the presence of police who 
violently (and often arbitrarily) enforced racially based oppression, the visible difference in 
the economic state of either side of the border; all of these combined to form a story of 
oppression. Many of these symbols persist today, telling of a continued state of oppression 
(dubbed ‘economic Apartheid’ by some). The border post thus represents the past and its 
effect on the present in the form of a narrative with recurring events and themes. 
The narrative-like nature of place allows us to consider another feature of place: trace. 
Janz speaks of places as texts which can be read (2009: 21). In this way, all places can be 
thought of as a crime scene. Crime scenes contain different traces of the events that happened 
in them. Some of these traces are blatant (e.g. the blood stain on the wall), others less so (e.g. 
depressions in the carpet where the murderer stood) and still others are hidden (e.g. the 
cricket bat meticulously cleaned and returned to the closet). The traces in a place form part of 
the symbolic network from which we derive the meaning of a place. There are traces of 
practices (e.g. the old railings that marked where people would queue at the border post) and 
traces of events (e.g. bullet holes in a wall). There are even traces of previous formulations of 
a place, such as written and oral stories that include the Transkei border past as a place that 
divided families or robbed people of their right to citizenship. People who are familiar with 
these formulations, events or practices are able to read their traces in a place long after they 
have passed. Another example of a trace-rich place is a deconsecrated church. Those who are 
familiar with Christian practice would be able to read the traces of the previous religious 
place; but someone from another culture entirely would have trouble deciphering the 
relevance of the features of the building.  
Up until this point, I have been discussing place in terms of subjectivity. Milieu, 
practice, provenance and trace are all closely tied up with subjectivity and each other. We do 
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not experience each of these as separate – rather they are all part of subjectivity, and the 
experience of place. In this way they constitute the phenomenological part of Janz’s analysis 
of place. But there is another approach which we can use to understand place: a hermeneutic 
one. The hermeneutic approach focuses on place as a text to be read. Now, it must be made 
clear that, when it comes to place, these two approaches imply each other. Throughout my 
summary of Janz’s phenomenological analysis of place, I have had to speak of place as a 
meaningful text. Even when we look at trace, we are forced to consider place as something 
which can be ‘read’. Similarly, considering place as a text necessarily implies 
phenomenology. A text is only a text insofar as it can be read, and what we are reading here 
is a world which we as subjects are continually and collectively creating. So, my distinction 
between Janz’s phenomenological and his hermeneutic approaches is only a heuristic one, 
meant to give a greater understanding of his project. Now, to investigate Janz’s hermeneutic 
approach, let us turn to our third example: Grahamstown. 
 
3
rd
 example: Grahamstown 
Grahamstown is a very small city with around 80,000 inhabitants. Despite its size, unlike my 
other two examples, Grahamstown is a complex place: it consists of many smaller places, has 
existed for around 200 years and observed by multiple different people, each of whom sees it 
differently.
58
 Therefore, I cannot hope to give an adequate description of it in the limited 
space of a philosophy paper. Nevertheless, by discussing certain aspects of Grahamstown, we 
are able to provide illustration for some of Janz’s more important, hermeneutic concepts of 
place.  
Like most of South Africa’s smaller towns, Grahamstown is strongly racialised: there 
are ‘white’, ‘coloured’ and ‘black’ parts of town.59 These divisions also reflect the economic 
inequalities of the town. Grahamstown then consists of many smaller places. Janz calls these 
smaller places ‘topemes’ (2009: 13-14, 223-224). Janz arrives at the concept of the topeme by 
asking, ‘What is the smallest intelligible unit of place that is intelligible as a place?’ A 
topeme then is a relative concept; topemes are the parts of a whole that is determined by the 
conversation we are currently taking part in (2009: 231). These parts, of course can be 
thought of as wholes themselves. For instance, Grahamstown consists of various districts, one 
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 Although these are no longer as strongly enforced as during the Apartheid era, one finds that few people 
actually challenge the habitual practice of living in an area that was formerly classified as belonging to ‘another 
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of them being Rhodes University. But Rhodes University itself can be thought of as a whole 
place which consists of smaller place, i.e. faculties, departments, residences and support 
facilities. As with symbols in a place, Janz states that topemes are arranged according to 
topoi, or narrative themes (2009: 223). So there is a story that is commonly understood about 
how Rhodes University relates to the rest of Grahamstown. Similarly, part of what makes 
Grahamstown the town that it is (and an exemplar of the South African condition) is just how 
the different racialised areas of Grahamstown are thought to relate to each other. The topoi 
that arrange these topemes are ones of inequality, privilege and segregation as they have been 
enacted in Grahamstown’s history.  
Although Janz makes it clear that place is in part tied to an actual geographical 
location, the topemes that go into making a place may be places that are not commonly 
thought of as located geographically. At one point, Janz talks of ‘race’ as a topeme in both the 
Kenyan and the South African place (2009: 226). It is not readily apparent, but race and other 
identity markers are places that are geographically located. How race is understood differs in 
various parts of the world; the identity marker is manifested in different ways even between 
two African countries such as South Africa and Kenya. In South Africa, as Grahamstown 
illustrates, race is literally inscribed in our urban planning – race and place of habitation 
become nearly synonymous.
60
 Although Kenyan places are influenced by a concept of race, it 
is different there primarily because there are many fewer white Kenyans and because it was 
never as radically segregated as in South Africa. Race is such a prominent feature of the 
South African intellectual place precisely because it is concretely expressed in our lived 
place. Although a white South African and a black South African may occupy the same larger 
place (Grahamstown), there is a very real sense in which they occupy different smaller 
places. At the very least, we can say that their milieus are vastly different – what is seen as 
comfortable and beneficial to one may appear threatening to the other precisely because of 
the topoi of Grahamstown. 
How do these smaller topemes relate to Grahamstown as a whole, meaningful place? 
Janz considers this a question of aggregation (2009: 14-15, 224-229). He compares place to 
language – both consist of meaningful packages which in turn are made from simpler 
meaningful packages (2009: 223). Like language, the meaning of a larger place is not simply 
the aggregation of its constituent parts (2009: 232). Rather, places present themselves as 
irreducible wholes (2009: 14). The meaning of a sentence is only partially dependent on its 
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constituent parts – to derive the full meaning of an utterance we need to look at context and 
intention. Similarly, although the topemes contribute something to the meaning of 
Grahamstown, they only tell part of the story. As we have discussed, the provenance and 
narrative of Grahamstown would play another part in determining its meaning as a unit of 
place. How Grahamstown relates to the Eastern Cape as larger place and to other constituent 
parts of the Eastern Cape is yet another part of how its meaning is created.  
Janz maintains that conveying the constituent parts of a place (even if one managed to 
conveyed all the constituent parts) one would not be able to convey the place itself. This is 
because, to some extent, places are unavoidably particular (Janz, 2004b). In this way, a place 
may be thought of as like a person. Janz does not make this connection, but the analogy 
seems fitting. There are reducible, communicable elements of a person – her ‘facts’, so to 
speak – but knowing these does not amount to knowing the person being described. People, 
like places, have a provenance/history, bear scars/traces and have relational identities, such as 
being someone’s mother.61 The analogy is useful for envisioning how being acquainted with 
the meaning a place has is not reducible to knowing its features. To know Grahamstown, one 
has to have been there and spent some time there. But the analogy is not complete. Places, 
unlike people, consist of smaller units that are themselves places (topemes). And places, 
unlike people, are partially determined by the conversation that is being had. 
What makes us group certain places together? Janz mentions how Mudimbe 
highlights that most Africans did not think of Africa as place until they came into contact 
with non-Africans (2009: 233). Prior to this, they thought of their place along more local 
lines – our family/tribe’s place versus another family/tribe’s place. Africa became a place 
worthwhile talking about when Africans entered into a conversation with non-Africans.
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How Africa came into being as a unified place reveals an important aspect of place – it is 
determined by the conversation in which we are using it. Or rather, the scale at which we 
consider our place depends on who our interlocutor is and what our intention is. ‘“Place” is a 
malleable term’ (Janz, 2009: 230). We may focus on different levels of place: the house, the 
suburb, the city, the province, the country, the continent, or even the whole world. For 
example, Janz explains that African and Africana
63
 philosophy are vastly different (2009: 
224-229). African and Africana philosophy do not agree on many things, including on how 
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they define the scale of their place, and even tend to focus on different issues. Yet, there are 
times when we would want to consider them as occupying the same place – one of having to 
respond to the denigration of black bodies, the systematic oppression by European powers 
and the western dismissal of African intellectuality. At other times, we may want to consider 
them separately, or even at more local levels. Similarly, when we look at Grahamstown, the 
scale at which we consider place depends on the conversation we are having. Even when we 
are talking about where we are from, we adjust our answer accordingly. One might identify 
with a region of Grahamstown when talking to another Grahamstonian (Grahamstown is too 
large a place), with Grahamstown when talking to another South African (Grahamstown is a 
place) or with South Africa when the person does not know the country (Grahamstown is too 
small a place). This is not merely a matter of etiquette: although the boundaries of Africa are 
determined by a conversation, they have a very real impact on the way we investigate place. 
Africa becomes a place worthy of investigation because of the way it has been treated in the 
past.  
In part, we determine how big this place is by comparing it to what it is not (Janz, 
2009: 16). Place, unlike a text, is closely tied to who we are: place grounds identity (Janz, 
2009: 16). And as with identity, places become crystallised when they are contrasted with 
places that are decidedly not the same. Liminal identities and places are those which 
challenge the ‘us/them’ distinction (Janz, 2009: 16). In Grahamstown, Rhodes students 
occupy a liminal place. In one sense, they are definitely part of Grahamstown – it is, after all, 
a university town. Yet, in another, almost all of these students are foreign. They tend to be 
socially liberal in a socially conservative town. They do not form part of the Grahamstown 
community. Most importantly, almost all the students are not originally from Grahamstown. 
In a town where many families can trace their living in this land well into the 1800s and even 
earlier, whether you and your family are from Grahamstown is an important feature of your 
identity. In the case of Grahamstown, however, the liminal position of being a Rhodes 
student has been accepted by the community as part of the place of Grahamstown. But this 
need not always be the case: currently, several African nationalist leaders claim that gender-
queer individuals are ‘un-African’. Arguably, people tend to exclude liminal places and 
identities when they feel threatened. Despite the tendency to want to homogenise place 
around one identity or narrative, ‘places are never univocal,’ Janz tells us (2009: 232). There 
may be dominant portrayals of a place, but there are usually also minority portrayals which 
challenge the milieu of the dominant. Middle class Grahamstonians would, for example, see 
Rhodes as a symbol of Grahamstown’s development and educational significance in the 
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region; impoverished Grahamstonians would identify it as a place that they cannot go, and 
possibly a symbol of oppression. Part of what makes a portrayal of place dominant is that it 
sets the topic for the discussion on place. Minority voices may disagree about what is said, 
but they constantly find themselves having to respond to the dominant voice. This 
disagreement, of course, forms the outline that determines the shape of African philosophy, 
as discussed in Chapter 1 (also see Janz, 2009: 233). Doing philosophy-in-place is to be 
sensitive to how the borders of a place are defined and disputed (Janz, 2009: 234).  
According to Janz, ‘Deleuze argues that heterogeneity is productive’ (2009: 236). 
When people disagree about a topic, they are forced to develop critical ways of analysing 
them. This, of course, becomes the basis for philosophy. Janz uses Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of intensity to explain how this works. Intensity, he says, works like the anode and 
cathode in a battery (2009: 236). The difference between two narratives about a place forces 
us to explain why such difference can exist and how we ought to deal with it in daily life. By 
looking at the different views of Rhodes in Grahamstown, we are challenged to explain how 
such difference arises and how we as academics ought to respond to people with different 
views to our own.   
Janz calls being sensitive to place and the different views of it ‘listening and 
speaking’. He expressly avoids the term ‘dialogue’ as it often implies a dominance from 
without – much like the 19th century missionary or colonial officer who set the tone and 
topics of the ‘dialogue’ with the ‘natives’ (2009: 242-243). Listening and speaking 
acknowledges that by taking part in a discussion about a place, one plays a role in how that 
place is constructed. But, as hermeneutic principle, it requires that the participant in this 
conversation let go of his preconceptions. Janz emphasises that listening and speaking 
requires us to be sensitive to the critical structures used by people in that place to evaluate 
their own place (2009: 244). As academics brought up in a western tradition of philosophy, 
we tend automatically to categorise questions into epistemology, axiology, ontology and 
methodology (Janz, 2004c: 105). While there may be something useful about doing this 
because it brings new insights about a place (see Janz: 2012), it closes us off to engaging with 
the philosophical tradition of that place. This is not a call for us to do ethnophilosophy, or to 
only do African philosophy as some sort of uncritical anthropology. Instead, Janz asks us to 
take part in a two-way critical engagement with place. To do philosophy-in-place, we need to 
find out ‘what matters’ in a place and work within the critical structures of that place to 
engage with these topics. As with any discipline, it is possible to work within the critical 
structures available to challenge and redefine them. But this should not be done assuming that 
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the critical structures of one place ought to act as the standard for another. Although Janz 
does not say it, what he outlines here amounts to academic humility. 
Janz offers a very rich account of place. In the above section, I have given examples 
of place to provide an exposition. Figure 1 provides a summary of this exposition. Before we 
continue to use place, there is one question which I should attend to before moving on: Is 
place still applicable in a digital age, where geographical location no longer limits our scope 
for interaction? There are two responses currently available to this worry. The first is that the 
world is (and will probably remain) only partially digitalised. While the internet may be 
reaching more and more places, there are still many places where internet access is not 
prevalent. Furthermore, it seems barring all humans actually being plugged into machines, we 
will continue to occupy and need to move through geographically located places. The second 
response is to say that Janz’s concept of place can be adapted to virtual places. It is very 
telling that we tend to talk about online locations in terms of place: we visit a website, we go 
from one page to another, we navigate or surf the web, ask people to leave or get off our 
Facebook pages. The online world is a virtual place onto which it seems that we transpose 
our embodied knowledge of geographically located places. Of course, this needs further 
investigation, but the point remains: we are more than capable of adapting the concept of 
place to online places. 
 
Philosophy-in-Place: How Does Philosophy Relate to Place? 
Up until this point, I have aimed at just providing an exposition of place. This exposition is 
nowhere as comprehensive as Janz’s own understanding, but it provides us with a working 
model to begin discussing philosophy-in-place. Because Janz redirects the conversation 
towards phenomenological hermeneutics, we can safely expect that he sees philosophy as 
being primarily motivated by phenomenological and hermeneutic questions. But what are 
these questions and what distinguishes them from the questions that drive other disciplines 
forward? In the last section of this Chapter, I will discuss what exactly philosophy is, how it 
relates to place and what we can expect from philosophy-in-place. 
As I have already said, Janz believes that philosophy is a ‘response to a question or a 
set of questions’ about place (2009: 217). But something more needs to be said about these 
questions – after all, one could ask the very same questions about place as an anthropologist. 
Throughout his book (2009), Janz contrasts philosophy with anthropology. The main 
difference between these two disciplines is the level of criticality. Anthropologists document 
people and their engagement with place; such documentation aims at preserving a set of 
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views, rather than critically engaging with them. Doing philosophy-in-place, we are rather to 
engage critically with the place at hand. When I ask, ‘What is it to do philosophy in this 
place?’ what I am actually asking is, ‘What (sorts of) questions are better going to help me 
understand this place?’ Janz canvasses several historical answers to this question: 
‘One way of distinguishing between pre-Kantian European philosophy, 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy and post-Kantian European 
philosophy […] is to recognize that the first would identify a truly 
philosophical question as one which strives for a universal, the second 
would see a truly philosophical question as one which aims to clarify 
language, and the third would define a philosophical question as one which 
shows forth the potential and the aporias of a life-world. Are these 
questions mutually exclusive? I do not think so […].’ (2009: 220) 
Given these three definitions of philosophical questions and the nature of place as discussed 
above, I would like to propose a broad definition of philosophical questions. Philosophical 
questions are those that aim at fundamental understanding of our place, and provide us with a 
rational way of coherently integrating this understanding into our broader intellectual being. 
By fundamental understanding, I mean an understanding of the principles at play in a place. 
These principles and how we represent them are thus an abstraction from place, where place 
provides us with the material to refine into principles.
64
  
Place, however, is not merely raw data. By analysing place, we run into a peculiar 
problem. Place, as I have mentioned, necessarily involves the subject. So an investigation of 
place is one which also investigates the subject. For this reason, Janz identifies the types of 
questions we ask about place (philosophy) with what Gabriel Marcel calls ‘mysteries’ (Janz, 
2009: 13). Mysteries are problems that necessarily implicate the subject and which are not 
open to be solved by means of a replicable technical process where all that matters is the end 
result (Marcel, 1950: 4-7). By contrast, ‘a mystery is something in which I am myself 
involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as a sphere where the distinction between 
what is in me and what is before me loses its meaning and initial validity’ (Marcel, 1949: 
117). The way we approach a mystery is thus the same as we might understand therapy: it is 
personally tailored and more emphasis is put on undergoing the process than the end result. 
Indeed, we may never come to satisfyingly complete answer to a mystery; Collin McGinn, for 
instance, argues that the mysteries of philosophy are in principle unsolvable because we have 
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not evolved the capacities to do so (1993). Philosophy then is the ‘therapy’ we undergo to 
help us understand our place at a fundamental level.  
Philosophy is at its core a phenomenological project – one which is aimed at 
ameliorating the place-bound, embodied subject. The questions we ask in philosophy are 
aimed at resolving the tensions of our place (Janz, 2011: 178). In doing so, it changes our 
place (and to some extent our milieu). In particular, philosophy leaves concepts behind as 
traces of our action, and these concepts become part of the new place (Janz, 2011: 177-179). 
As I have said, these concepts are merely markers of the philosophical process. Ubuntu is one 
such concept. But, in keeping with Janz’s wolf scent-markings analogy, I have argued that 
ubuntu is a half-digested concept – a sign that the ‘wolf’ with which we are now dealing is not 
digesting things properly. At some level, we as African philosophers are not processing our 
place properly. In order to diagnose what is wrong with our wolf, we need to better 
understand the process of digestion. In other words, we need to look at how philosophy ought 
to refine a place and where we are falling short of this process. 
Janz provides a model for the abstraction of place in his treatment of Lefebvre. Janz 
uses Lefebvre’s distinction between ‘perceived space’, ‘conceived space’ and ‘lived space’ 
(2009: 223-224). (Janz writes in such a way that he takes Lefebre’s ‘space’ to signify the 
same thing as his ‘place’.) Perceived space consists of our practices within a place. This 
equates to Praeg’s notion of praxis, or a set of actualised principles embodied in daily 
behaviour (2011). We already have a perceived space in ubuntu-praxis which I discussed at 
the beginning of this thesis. Conceived space is how we conceptualise our place. It is highly 
abstracted, places very little emphasis on the subject and tends towards an universalisable 
picture of a place. A successful philosophical concept should operate at the level of 
conceived space. Lived space is how we represent our place through symbols, narratives and 
pictures. Lived space mediates perceived space to conceived space. Philosophy typically 
happens at all three of these levels. The problem with African Philosophy is that it does not 
have much work in the realm of lived space (Janz, 2009: 224). Either African philosophers 
practice ethnophilosophy or they look at African places as universalisable. For example, Tutu 
(1999), Ramose (2003) and Keevey (2009) are engaged more in philosophy at the level of 
perceived space, documenting expressions of ubuntu; while philosophers such as Marx 
(2002), Metz (2007) and Praeg (2009) work primarily at the level of conceived space, dealing 
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with ubuntu as an abstract concept that itself can be subjected to analysis.
65
 What is needed is 
a critical appraisal of African places and the questions they generate. With ubuntu, there 
needs to be more critical investigations of how ubuntu explains our place(s).  
Because of this lack, we are faced with a sense of alienation – that is, an inability to 
read the South African place. In other words, because we have failed to ask fundamental 
questions about the mysteries of the South African process, we have not been able to produce 
philosophical work that resolves the tensions and mysteries of the South African place. As a 
result, our philosophical work is lacking, concepts such as ubuntu lack clout and, ultimately, 
we are compromised as subjects. For ubuntu, or any other South African philosophical 
project, to be successful, it must start by attempting to resolve the mysteries of the South 
African place. By using ubuntu to produce meaningful explanations and ways of dealing with 
our mysteries, we simultaneously give the concept scope and develop a defining corpus of 
work which can be further analysed to produce the critical depth with Mbembe points to as 
missing in African philosophy (2002). In the following chapter, I turn my attention to these 
mysteries.  
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 Admittedly, this thesis’s project falls within the range of the latter group, because what is being conducted 
here is metaphilosophy which treats ubuntu as concept as the focal point of the investigation. 
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 Chapter 3 
 
Re-imagining Philosophy 
Janz’s philosophy-in-place requires us to rethink all philosophical projects. To do 
philosophy-in-place, one must reconsider how philosophy relates to the concrete world, 
specifically to places that already exist. The current predominant assumption of philosophy is 
that it reasons about abstract universal concepts, which are not contingent on any place. 
These concepts include both ideas (‘truth’, ‘racism’) and methodologies (‘deontic principles’, 
‘reflective equilibrium’). We may find examples of these concepts in particular phenomena, 
but philosophy is traditionally only concerned with such particulars insofar as they give 
insights into the nature of the abstract universal concepts they embody. The way we speak 
about philosophy reveals our bias towards this understanding of philosophy: ethics, for 
example, has an ‘applied’ branch, suggesting that the principles exist before the application. 
Philosophy-in-place in fact requires that we work in the reverse; that is, from the particular to 
the universalised. In this chapter, I have three aims: 
1) To provide a framework for how particular phenomena in place give rise to 
philosophy; 
2) To argue for (1) by analysing particular phenomena in South Africa (thus providing 
introductory remarks for South African philosophy); and 
3) To argue that working with a universal-to-particular (as opposed to a particular-to-
universalised) model of philosophy has been unproductive for South African 
philosophy. 
These three aims are interdependent. If I hold (1) to be true (as I must if I am to argue for 
it), it is necessary for me to start with a particular example. Doing (2) provides us with a 
particular example: philosophy in South Africa. (2) is the core aim of this chapter: 
prolegomena for South African philosophy. (1) and (3) provide a foundation for (2):  (1) 
provides a theoretical structure for (2); (3) does the necessary negative work to show that 
traditional conceptions of philosophy are flawed. (2) is designed to act as a catalyst. (For a 
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summary of this, see Figure 2). In this chapter, I ask questions that I argue should direct 
philosophical projects in this place. These questions themselves can be changed, but the 
underlying point remains: South African philosophy needs to develop its own conceptual 
framework for understanding its place. 
This chapter does not provide an argument for relativism. Relativism, as an opposing 
view may take it, would make critical conversation between places impossible. Instead, the 
particular-to-universalised model of philosophy I am advocating here promotes a more 
rigorous method of forming universalised philosophical concepts – one which takes into 
account the role that place plays in forming all philosophical concepts. Such universalised 
concepts (such as human rights) become applicable across the board not for any reason other 
than the brute fact that humans tend to communicate concepts and to homogenise as they 
have greater lines of communication, as is the case today.
66
 The end result of communication 
between philosophers from various places – the universalised conceptual framework – bears 
the trademarks of a universal concept. Both universal and universalised concepts are assumed 
to be useful for explaining multiple particular phenomena in different places.
67
 Both can be 
used as a normative standard when assessing the moral calibre of particular actions. But the 
particular-to-universalised model is explicit about dependence of all concepts on place. For 
example, while we may be able to analyse particular states of affairs according to human 
rights, if we take the above model seriously we must concede that the terminology of human 
rights is a response to a particular place. We are thus only able to use the terminology of 
human rights if we are conscious of the place(s) from which they have come, the place(s) 
which have changed them and the place(s) to which they are being applied (in other words, 
the provenance of human rights).
68
 Not to be explicit about the provenance of concepts is to 
allow for the false assumption that a given feature of a concept that is in fact dependent on a 
particular place would hold for all other places. As I will argue, not being conscious of the 
provenance of a concept is to assume (often wrongly) that what mattered in the place where 
the concept was formed matters in the new place in which it is being used. 
Let us turn to what is required by doing philosophy-in-place. The basic particular-to-
universalised model of philosophy implied is as follows: 
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 This is not to rule out the possibility of another, metaphysical reason for our creating universalised concepts, 
but for now this brute, and basically observable, fact provides sufficient explanation. 
67
 Note: not ‘regardless of place’. 
68
 For example, human rights have their origins in Ancient Greek thought, were revived during the European 
Reformation and later during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries to justify revolutions, and were used later as a response 
to the horrors of the Second World War. Currently, human rights are being used to monitor international 
relations. 
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1) Start with a particular phenomenon* in a particular place, 
2) Develop a conceptual framework for dealing with* the particular phenomenon, 
3) Use conceptual framework to understand similar phenomena in the same place, 
4) Refine the conceptual framework to be able to represent significant features of 
phenomena in this place, 
5) Repeat steps (1) to (4) 
6) Compare the conceptual framework with others that deal with similar phenomena in 
other places; 
7) Develop a universalised conceptual framework to account for multiple particular 
phenomena; 
8) Adjust the universalised conceptual framework as one encounters new particulars. 
(*I will clarify these terms shortly). 
Obviously this is a very simplified model which will be expanded in this chapter. It is a 
normative ideal – and not a complete explanation of how we form philosophical concepts. As 
I will argue later, it is impossible for us to do (1) simply; we will always have a hermeneutic 
bias, informed by concepts either at step (3), step (6) or step (7). We can nonetheless hold this 
model as an ideal: one which we can modify our action to resemble more and more closely. 
Steps (1) to (5) happen within a single place. Only from step (6) should we consider other 
places. The product of step (7) is the universalised conceptual framework which in some 
ways resembles the abstract universal of traditional philosophy. Traditionally, philosophers 
have been largely ignorant that they go through steps (1) to (5), and have tended to see their 
work as going in a reverse direction – from a universal to a particular.  
 Let us consider an example of a potential particular-to-universal growth of a concept. 
Writing in the 1960s and 1970s, Steve Biko sought to understand relationships between black 
and white people. In particular, he wanted to explain why black South Africans deferred to a 
minority white population, and why white South Africans took for granted their position in 
South African society. We can identify this deference as the phenomenon that Biko started 
with, or his (1). In order to explain the black-white relationship, Biko came up with the 
concepts of the black inferiority and white superiority complexes. These complexes explain 
the psychological conditions which allow the oppressive power-relations of Apartheid to 
persist. As an engagement with a particular phenomenon in a particular place, these 
complexes are at level (2) in the particular-to-universal model above. At this level, they are 
very particular, local explanatory concepts, meant only to explain a particular phenomenon. 
Now, Biko could move outwards, applying his concept of the inferiority-superiority 
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complexes at a different phenomenon in the same place, such as the relationship between 
coloured and black South Africans or gender relations in South Africa. As he does this, he 
would find that he would have to adjust the concept slightly each time to account for the 
particularities of each phenomenon. By applying his concept to more phenomena, we are able 
to start universalising Biko’s inferiority-superiority complexes as a method of analysis. 
Finally, we would want to ‘export’ Biko’s concept to other places, using it to understand race 
and power relations in the USA or immigrant-local relationships in China. Sometimes the 
concept will have to be adjusted to fit new data – perhaps inferiority/superiority complexes 
manifest themselves differently in different places. Each time, the concept is adjusted so as to 
account for both previously encountered phenomena and the current phenomenon. This 
process amounts to a more abstract (and less particular-dependent) explanation that can be 
given by the concept. Of course, we may find that some phenomena simply avoid being 
explained by the concept, but this is not a problem for the concept unless it purports to 
provide a unified theory of everything. 
Why start with a particular phenomenon, in a particular place? As I have already 
covered in the previous chapter, places are structured around what matters. The significance 
of a phenomenon – how it matters and what components of it are salient in this place – is 
determined by the relationship that the particular phenomenon has with all other features of a 
place. It stands to reason that any conceptual framework meant to deal with a particular 
phenomenon must be designed to take into account how it matters in its place. Being 
structured so as to highlight what matters in a particular place is arguably what is called the 
‘logic’ of a conceptual framework. When we use a concept not from the place of the 
phenomenon we can considering, we risk using the ‘wrong’ logic – that is, a structure of 
thinking that highlights links with other phenomena in the place and with the place itself 
which would not be taken to be ‘what matters’ by people in that place.69 When we start with 
the phenomenon at hand, we are sensitive to the salient features it has in its place. We are 
therefore more capable of developing an accurate understanding of it. 
The class of phenomena that motivate us to do all philosophy are what Gabriel Marcel 
calls ‘mysteries’ (1949; 1950). A mystery is a kind of problem which:  
(a) implicates70 the subject, and  
                                                          
69
 It should be noted that using the ‘wrong logic’ in a place could be productive and a good way for people to 
explore their place. However, this should not be the preferred method with which we analyse a place as it does 
not deal with what matters to people in a place. 
70
 Marcel uses the term ‘implicates’. I take it that he means the subject matter reflects directly on how the 
subjects conceives of herself in both an ontological and ethical way. 
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(b) Because of (a), resists any solution which does not take the subject through a 
process. 
By process, I mean a series of actions which must be followed in a particular order to reach a 
result. Marcel argues that following a process is essential to philosophy, unlike pharmacy for 
instance where the patient need not re-create all the steps necessary for producing the drugs 
she is to consume. I would like to add a further criterion to Marcel’s framework: 
(c) A mystery undermines our ability to form a coherent understanding of our lives in 
a place.  
Mysteries are problems without a current solution. That such problems exist points to our 
inability to structure values or phenomena in such ways that create meaning, and it challenges 
our ability to understand and live in our place. In other words, mysteries threaten our ability 
to form a milieu. By undermining our ability to understand our place, mysteries threaten our 
access to the good life. One of the requirements for a good life is that one is able to find 
meaning in one’s place, or ‘re-present’ it in such a way that reveals what matters (cf. Janz, 
2009:17-18). The converse, that one is unable to meaningfully represent one’s place, is a 
situation which we recognise as being chaotic and traumatic. Janz holds that being unable to 
understand one’s place is a symptom of the dispossession that Africans underwent through 
colonialism and slavery, what he terms ‘alienation’ (2009: 17-18).71 A phenomenon thus 
becomes a mystery by the way it compromises our ability to make sense of our place. (c) 
gives us a motivational explanation for why we engage in philosophy at all: philosophy is the 
process we undergo when we are confronted by features of our relationship to place which 
undermine our ability to understand ourselves (in our place) or our place itself, in order to re-
create a meaningful understanding of our place. It should be made clear that mysteries do not 
only become apparent to philosophers, in the same way that diseases do not only affect 
doctors. Rather, mysteries make philosophy a healthy engagement with place for people, and 
trying to solve mysteries constitutes all philosophy.
72
 
In response to mysteries, philosophy creates concepts which allow us to understand 
mysteries in such a way that we are able to develop a meaningful narrative about our place 
(Janz, 2011: 178). Instead of this understanding being ‘abstract’ and ‘universal’, it is 
‘fundamental’ – that is, it picks out the way phenomena relate to each other in this place and 
generates rules for behaviour based on these relationships. Thus, philosophy aims at a 
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 One may be able to identify a similar disconnect in white South Africans who now perceived the government 
and legislature of the country as antagonistic and closed to their desires. 
72
 It follows that professional philosophy is just the refinement of what most people would do when faced with a 
disjunctive understanding of their place. 
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fundamental understanding of mysteries. Like tensions mentioned in the last chapter, 
mysteries are not simply solved; rather we need to incorporate them into our rational 
understanding of the world. I take it that understanding is the process of incorporation. Unlike 
a universal understanding, to have a fundamental understanding we must take into account 
the contingent (but significant) features of the place under scrutiny. Our aim in doing 
philosophy in South Africa is to: 
d) Gain a fundamental understanding of the place(s) and its mysteries; and 
e) Develop rules for behaviour based on the understanding gained in (d). 
South African philosophy’s first aim, then, is to delineate the mysteries of this place.  
I cannot cover all these mysteries in this chapter. So, instead, I have chosen to start 
the discussion by proposing an overall structure for these mysteries, starting with the most 
prevalent and central problem of our place, and then relating other significant ones to it. The 
first mystery, the fragmentation of the South African Place, is one which I take to affect 
everyone in South Africa. It problematises any analysis of the South African place. It is also 
the direct result of a history of violent and forced migrations in this place. The fragmentation 
of the South African place is primarily manifested through the divisive racialisation of people 
groups, and so a discussion on the mystery of fragmented place in South Africa must include 
a discussion on the mystery of race. However interrelated these two mysteries are, they are 
also distinct, so that a conceptual framework meant to deal with the one may not necessarily 
deal with the other. I situate fragmented place as the foundational mystery which has given 
rise to the other South African mysteries. The next mystery one must discuss here is our 
inability as academics to rid ourselves of our hermeneutic biases when analysing this place. 
This mystery compromises our being able to approximate the normative ideal laid out above. 
It also problematises any attempt to write about the South African place. As this is a 
prolegomenon, I do not aim to give any answers to these mysteries, but mainly to set them 
out. 
One might ask, ‘How does this relate to ubuntu?’ I have, after all, started this thesis 
with ubuntu as an anchoring point for the argument laid out here. Ubuntu, I shall argue in the 
last chapter of this thesis, has been a particularly interesting concept in South African because 
it promises to be able to give us either a fundamental understanding of some of these 
mysteries, or because it gives us rules for behaviour considering these mysteries, or both. It 
has failed to do so because we have had the wrong conception of philosophy, expecting 
ubuntu to cope at the level of steps (6) and (7) of the normative model above before it had 
successfully undergone steps (1) to (5). If we are to see ubuntu thrive as a South African 
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concept, we must allow it to cut its teeth on South African issues first and foremost. This 
does not mean that ubuntu is the panacea for South Africa’s mysteries. It is rather to be 
understood that its success is part of a Hegelian dialectic. In Hegel’s understanding of 
philosophy, a thesis is proposed (e.g. ubuntu), and in response an antithesis immediately 
becomes viable. These two concepts eventually merge, after significant modification to each, 
to form a synthesis, which itself becomes a new thesis. Ubuntu is merely a contender for 
understanding our place, and its successful formulation will allow for other, contradictory 
formulations to be proposed. In order to do any of this, we must know which mysteries these 
concepts must respond to, and hence the subject of this chapter. 
 
The Foundational Mystery: The Fragmented South African Place 
The expressed aim of Apartheid was ‘separate development’, which was achieved through 
the forceful separation of places. Apartheid itself was a distillation of segregationist 
ideologies of the first part of the 20
th
 century (See Worden, 2000; Guelke, 2005). The 
tendency towards the segregation of place can be traced even further back, to Jan van 
Riebeeck’s hedge which marked the division between the European Cape Colony and the 
‘rest of Africa’. Given this history of enforced divisions, it should not come as a surprise that 
Xolela Mangcu is able to remark on the lack of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘civic religion’, or 
commonly held public values which are meant to bind a society together, in South Africa 
(2001). Mangcu’s essay (2001) highlights the fragmentation of the South African place. 
Without a civic religion, the concept of a distinct and distinguishable South African place 
becomes questionable. Janz remarks that places are not simply the aggregation of their 
composite topemes, but instead holistically meaningful entities (2009). When we look at the 
South African place, however, it appears that the only meaningful sense in which we can talk 
about the South African place is as an aggregation of smaller, conflicting places. The 
fragmentation of place is the root mystery in South Africa: it remains easily discernible and is 
pervasive throughout the country. It is worthwhile considering how this fragmentation came 
about before attempting to describe it in further depth. 
South Africa has, since before its creation as a state in 1910, contained a number of 
different people groups. As place is a social construct, places formed around these people 
groups, dictated by their internal informal logic. As can be expected, these groups have gone 
through periods where they peacefully interacted and shared each other’s places, and periods 
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where they sought to homogenise their places through the expulsion of others.
73
 However, by 
the 20
th
 century, the white colonial state began gearing its policies solely towards segregation 
and the homogenisation of place. The Natives Land Act, 1913, marks a definite turn towards 
the segregation of place: it set aside semi-autonomous reserves for black South Africans and 
limited land acquisition by black South Africans to only these reserves. By 1948 and the 
implementation of formal Apartheid, the overall tendency was to homogenise place. This was 
done on two levels and through two different types of policies.  
On the formal level, Apartheid was a set of laws which enforced homogeneity of 
place. The formal level of Apartheid is characterised by the laws passed under the Nationalist 
government, and the legal basis for it was relatively easily undone by repealing the Apartheid 
laws in 1991.
74
 However, the formal level fostered a set of attitudes and patterns for social 
and business interactions which are more pervasive and innocuous. Mangcu recounts how, 
growing up as black boy in King William’s Town, white people’s conscious and unconscious 
actions communicated his inferiority and otherness to him (2001: 16). These othering 
attitudes were conveyed through subtle features of interactions: the language and register one 
used to talk to someone, the suspicion one regarded another with when they entered your 
store for the first time, attitudes towards bodily contact. Similarly, I came across a spoken 
account by a former domestic worker who told how her employers would not let her use any 
of the household cutlery and crockery; she remarked that even the family’s dog used a better 
plate than she had. The result of this more subtle Apartheid has been a cluster of 
psychological scars, including what Biko terms the black inferiority and white superiority 
complexes ([1978] 2002). Informal Apartheid has proven to be insidious and difficult to 
overcome as it consists of countless little actions that cannot be regulated through the law. 
While Apartheid was created on both the formal and the informal levels, it was 
enforced through two types of actions: one created and emphasised difference, the other 
prevented difference from being diminished. The Population Registration Act, 1950, codified 
the racial categories into law, elevating apparent ‘racial’ differences to the central defining 
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 We tend remember the periods of homogenisation (e.g. Shaka’s Mfecane and the Great Trek) over periods of 
inclusivity (the formation of District 6, the Sophiatown cultural life and the periods of peaceful coexistence 
between the amaXhosa and the Khoi-San peoples). A balanced history should take into account both these 
trends. 
74
 It is necessary to note that despite Apartheid laws having been repealed, the direct effects of these laws have 
been difficult to overcome. For example, the Group Areas Act, 1950, is no longer in effect, but the areas 
designated by this act for a particular racialised group remain occupied by predominantly the same racialised 
group today. 
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feature a person’s being.75 The Bantu Education Act (1950), the Group Areas Act (1950) and 
the Bantu Authorities Act (1951) were among the laws which aimed at creating separate and 
homogenous places. The Group Areas Act is of particular interest to us as it created 
geographically discernible places along racial lines: one can thus see it as the central act in 
fragmenting the South African place. So, while identity has elsewhere been seen as a social 
construct which is independent of a physical place, in South Africa the social construct of 
racial identity became inextricably linked with geographically discernible places. This makes 
Janz’s emphasis on place particularly desirable for South African philosophy: the intense 
racialisation of South Africans is bound up with concepts of place. A significant feature of 
how race is constructed in South Africa is that we take racialised groups
76
 to be associated 
with particular places, such that we can today meaningfully talk about ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
places. 
Despite emphasising apparently inevitable differences between the racialised groups, 
the South African government had to acknowledge that racial categories were not naturally 
clearly distinct. The South African government subscribed to a combination of two different 
forms of racialism: one being the pseudo-scientific biological determinism popular in the 
English world and the other being the Herderian notion of divinely mandated separate 
peoples (‘volke’) (Dubow, 2010).77 In both cases, the government had to ensure that either 
doctrine was not disproven. Acts such as the Immorality Acts (1927, 1957) perpetuated the 
myth that racialised groups were the result of some natural order (biologically or divinely 
mandated). Acts such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Reservation 
of Separate Amenities Act (1953) were designed to prevent mixed places from forming. The 
existence of stable and prosperous mixed places would bring into question the belief that 
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 It is noteworthy that, despite the Government’s best efforts to perpetuate the myth that race is a real and 
unchangeable feature of a person’s identity, it had to put in place a system whereby people could apply to have 
their official racial classification changed. This was partially motivated by the fact that often people of the same 
biological parentage would be placed in different categories. What is further remarkable is that most of the 
recorded applications to have one’s racial category changed actually succeeded. For a detailed discussion on this 
process, see Guelke (2005: 25-27) 
76
 It should be apparent that the most relevant feature of race in South Africa’s history is that it was socially 
constructed. Regardless of any biological differences, what is most striking about the South African example is 
the social and legal lengths the Government went to to instil the belief that races are biological and deterministic 
features of the world. (Blum provides a convincing argument as to why it makes no sense to talk of biological 
differences using racial categories (2010)). Because of the need to emphasise that race is a social construct, I am 
borrowing Blum’s term ‘racialized groups’  (2010) while preferring the South African convention of using the ‘-
ise’ suffix. 
77
 Dubow explains that the Afrikaans population were wary of the biological explanation of race for two 
reasons: 1) it espoused a Darwinian evolutionary schema which is at odds with the strongly Calvinistic beliefs of 
the Afrikaans; and 2) the scores of Afrikaners in psychometric tests held in the 1920s were statistically 
indistinguishable from their black counterparts, despite English speakers faring remarkably better (2010). 
Biological racialism therefore did not support the political aspirations of the Afrikaners at the time. 
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racial segregation is divinely mandated or an essential feature of the world. Thus, the 
Government also had to destroy places where different racialised groups were peacefully 
coexisting. District Six remains the foremost example of a pre-Apartheid place where 
racialised groups coexisted peacefully and often prosperously. By destroying mixed places, 
the Government stunted the development of inclusive places and set exclusive homogeneity 
as the social norm for South Africa. Today, South Africans view places formerly designated 
for other racialised groups with distrust: white South Africans today remain by and large 
wary of formerly black areas, seeing them as crime-ridden and mysteriously threatening. 
Furthermore, the effects of these laws persist in how today’s South African places are 
formed: ‘black’, ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ places are readily discernible, especially in urban 
places. Apartheid then has been unfortunately successful in creating a fragmented place. 
Let us focus on this: the fragmentation of the South African place has become a 
geographical division of place. This division is not simply along racialised lines, but includes 
differences in access to resources and to economic wellbeing. The aim of Apartheid was to 
structure South African society such that there was a large pool of low-income unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour (Terreblanche, 2002). In order to do this, the Government sought to 
restrict access to land, and thus to restrict access to the means of being economically 
independent of the colonial labour economy. Similarly, the Group Areas Act pushed many 
black Africans out of urban centres and forced them to live in townships on the outskirts of 
towns and cities, thus limiting their access to work opportunities in urban centres. By limiting 
access to land, the Government vastly hindered black South African’s access to the economic 
means of survival and self-improvement.
78
 The result is clearly visible more than twenty 
years after the collapse of Apartheid: urban and rural areas are divided into wealthier ‘white’ 
areas, middle ‘coloured’79 and ‘Indian’ areas, and poorer ‘black’ areas. As recently as 2009, 
the World Bank rated South Africa has having the highest inequality between rich and poor, 
and the 2011 Census found that different racialised groups fall into different earning brackets, 
with white South Africans earning as much as five times as much as their black counterparts 
(2012: 42). One of the main reasons for the maintained segregation of racialised places is that 
they coincide with economic ability: poorer black areas provide their inhabitants with fewer 
resources for economic improvement and so prevent them either from leaving the area for a 
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 Terreblance terms this process ‘pauperisation’ and gives a far more detailed description of it in South Africa 
in his book (2002: 31-44). 
79
 The term ‘coloured’ in South Africa denotes a racialised group descended from the Malay slaves of the Dutch 
East India Company, their Dutch masters, the Khoi-San peoples and black African labourers. They have since 
formed a distinct culture, such that the term does not refer merely to ‘mixed race’ people, but to people whose 
parents are also coloured.   
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richer one or from changing their area for the better. The mystery of the fragmentation of the 
South African place thus refers to divisions along race, geographical location and wealth 
lines. These divisions and the traces of their provenance are pervasive, informing every 
aspect of life in South Africa as South Africans self-identify primarily by their racialised 
group. Due to the policies of Apartheid, and to a far lesser extent to Black Economic 
Empowerment, South Africans associate racialised identity with economic means and are 
continually reminded of the conflation of race, place and wealth in numerous daily actions.  
To summarise the above, I have sketched out how the South African place is deeply 
divided along racialised, economic and geographical lines. How should we approach this 
fragmentation of place? There are two types of philosophical projects that can be conducted 
regarding a mystery: the first aims to understand it, and the second considers ways of living 
in a place that has it. Often, these two projects imply each other, such that conducting one 
project necessarily relies on conducting the other. Following Janz, I suggest that we avoid 
favouring a metaphysical approach to the mystery for the first project. It is clear that the 
fragmentation of the South African place is a social construct (just as place itself is a social 
construct) and saying that it is a social construct does not provide us with any meaningfully 
better understanding of how the mystery affects our lives. Instead, we need to consider 
questions that allow for the contingent but significant features of this mystery in our place to 
play philosophically important roles. Thus, we ought to favour phenomenological and 
hermeneutic questions about the fragmentation of place; that is, we should start with two 
broad questions: 
1) What is it like to live in this fragmented place? (Phenomenological Questions) 
And 
2) What does it mean to live in this fragmented place? (Hermeneutic Questions) 
These two questions can be further broken up in to smaller, ‘sub-questions’. As an example 
the phenomenological questions, one might focus on the racialisation of place when 
considering how place is fragmented in South Africa (‘What is it like to live in a racialised 
place?’). We might also ask what constitutes the concept of self in this fragmented place, 
where this question is to be seen as an extension of, ‘What is it like to live/be in this 
fragmented place?’ Phenomenological questions about the South African place bring up 
ethical questions. For example, if I am to consider what it is like to live as a racialised being, 
fixed as it were by the gaze of another, then I must also consider how I am to treat this other, 
how the other ought to treat me and whether this racialisation is desirable, or ethical. I take it 
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that these questions will require in depth investigation that is beyond the scope of a 
prolegomenon.  
For this discussion on the fragmentation of place, I am going focus on hermeneutic 
questions. From a hermeneutic perspective, philosophers must determine whether (and to 
what extent) we can talk about the South African place. Questions around the South Africa 
place as a meaningful unit fall under what Janz calls ‘questions of aggregation’ (2009). It is 
clear that South Africa’s topemes – its smaller units of place – play a prominent role in how 
this place is conceived of. One way to understand the fragmentation of place in South Africa 
is that these topemes have been so exclusively homogenous that we have failed to create an 
overarching sense of what matters in South Africa. Without this overarching sense of what 
matters, it seems that the South African place may simply be an aggregation of smaller 
places, rather than a holistically meaningful unit. The fragmentation of place manifests itself 
in a complete disagreement of what matters in the South African place because people 
occupying the various smaller topemes view shared place vastly differently. Consider for 
example, how one might identify what matters in Grahamstown. For a student, staff member 
or middle class white resident, Rhodes University is an integral part of the town, while the 
townships to the East are troublesome areas which Grahamstown has to handle in some way. 
However, for a black resident in the Joza township, the township is an integral part of the 
place (and not a problem to be solved) and the formerly white institution of Rhodes 
represents a rich/white incursion into the traditionally Xhosa lands of the Eastern Cape. Both 
groups orientate themselves towards different and exclusive interpretations of what matters in 
Grahamstown. When we talk about the place of Grahamstown, we could be talking about 
either of these two constructions of place, but it does not seem that we could be talking about 
both constructions simultaneously as they are exclusive of one another. The hermeneutic 
aspect of the fragmentation of place thus problematises what we refer to when we talk about a 
South African place.  
One may overcome this problem by constructing a comprehensive picture of the 
South African place, which accounts for all narratives of what matters in this place. By 
including every topeme’s construction of what matters in this place, we may get an overview 
of this whole (but fragmented) place. For example, Grahamstown may just be that place 
about which there are competing valuations. However, such an approach can only be a 
temporary solution to the problem. By providing a comprehensive picture of the different 
accounts of a place, we do not point out what matters in this place; we are only able to map 
out the areas of contestation between the different topemes. What is needed in the long term 
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is a sense of the shared values which underscore this place. Mangcu refers to the shared 
values which underscore and unify a place as a ‘civic religion’ (2001). 
Composite places that are not fragmented are constructed around a shared set of 
values or a general recognition of what matters in this place – they have a civic religion. 
Having shared values does not prevent smaller topemes from recognising different values or 
interpretations of what matters, but it does mean that these topemes agree on a baseline set of 
values. For example, multiple political and ethnic groups may occupy London and each of 
these groups recognises its own religious, cultural and ethical values. However, in order for 
these groups to coexist peacefully – and in order for us to talk about a shared place – they 
agree to mutually respect each other’s dignity and to mutually tolerate the other’s recognised 
values as far as is possible.
80
 The basis of their agreement forms a social contract which 
posits a set of mutually shared values. In other words, the different groups of London 
recognise that certain secular values matter and a composite place of London can be posited 
from these shared secular values. One approach to South Africa’s place is to consciously 
institute a shared set of public values; that is, to consciously create a civic religion.  
One might argue that we do have civic religion, as expressed in our Constitution. 
However, upon closer inspection, the 1996 Constitution does not embody an actually shared 
set of values. Z. Pallo Jordan points out that the Constitution arose out of a debate between 
the various stakeholders in the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) talks 
(2012: 31). The stakeholders were by and large suspicious of liberalism, but opted for a 
constitution which enshrined liberal values as the best method for protecting the insular 
groups’ interests (Jordan, 2012: 31). The Constitution enshrines values that we ought to hold, 
if we desire to share our place with others. Yet, it cannot act as a description of the values 
that we do hold precisely because it is not clear that all people groups in South Africa wish to 
cohabit in mixed, composite places. In short, South Africa’s constitutional liberalism exists 
despite the fact that liberalism is not the dominant ideology in South Africa. The dissonance 
between the normative standard of common values expressed in the Constitution and the 
actual contradictory sets of values expressed in South Africa becomes apparent when one 
considers that there is still a significant tendency within South Africa to homogenise places.
81
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 This is, in short, liberalism as is advocated by Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1972). The classical limitation on 
the extent to which groups’ values and practices are respected is that they be allowed to the extent that they do 
not unnecessarily limit another group’s values and practices. 
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 The homogenisation of place requires the violent suppression or expulsion of voices that do not assume the 
recognised values of a group. There are striking examples of this in South Africa. The phenomenon of corrective 
rape in South Africa has made international news. (Corrective rape is the rape of lesbians or transgendered 
people with the expressed aim of ‘correcting’ their sexuality.)  Arguably, it is part of a nativist project to 
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Arguably, the Constitution has failed to create a civic religion in South Africa because it 
embodies a response to another type of composite place, not a fragmented place. Therefore, 
the liberal values of the Constitution do not provide us with the shared values necessary for 
us to be able to talk about a holistically meaningful South African place. 
Failing liberalism, is there another sense of what matters which can be pointed to as a 
distinguishing marker of the South African place? At this point, we must leave the descriptive 
hermeneutic project and consider a prescriptive politico-ethical project. As far as the 
descriptive project is concerned, there is plenty of space for further investigation, but the 
point has been made: what we mean by ‘South Africa’ at present can only refer to a 
fragmented place. There is, however, also a prescriptive project: South Africans need to find 
another way of creating a civic religion. This civic religion must contain within it an 
imperative to be inclusive. If the different groups in South Africa recognise this imperative, 
then we have the basis to start talking meaningfully about a common South African place. 
Mangcu suggest that ubuntu may play this role (2001: 22). In the next Chapter of this 
thesis, I will consider how this may be. In the meantime, it is necessary for this 
prolegomenon that I consider another problematic mystery in South Africa. While the 
fragmentation of place is a generally felt mystery, it is one which academics show more 
promise in being able to solve: ethics, phenomenology, hermeneutics and political sciences 
are the domain of philosophers. However, philosophers’ ability to deal with this general 
mystery could be undermined if they are unable to describe the place properly. I consider this 
second mystery here because I, like any academic working on the South African place, need 
to admit the unavoidable problems of being an academic trained in a Western institution 
trying to understand the South African place. Any current South African philosophers 
working on the South African place will be affected by the following mystery. 
 
2
nd
 Mystery: How Do We As Academics Approach The South African Mysteries? 
In 2007, Metz published a ground-breaking paper, ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’. He 
uses a process of reflective equilibrium between a set of six normative intuitions that Africans 
and Westerners have in common, and six apparently distinctively African normative 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
recreate a mythical pure and traditional Africa as it seeks to forcibly maintain what are perceived as traditional 
sexualities. Similarly, Afrikaner nationalist groups have managed to entrench themselves in white-only, cultural 
communities, such as Kleinfontein outside of Pretoria and Orania in the Free State. Arguably, these incidents 
point towards a continuation of the Apartheid tendency to homogenise place, which is expressed to different 
degrees throughout South Africa. 
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intuitions to arrive at a deontological principle which is meant to summarise ubuntu. The 
deontological principle is: 
‘An action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord; 
an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community.’ (Metz, 
2007: 334) 
If Metz is right, then he succinctly captures what ubuntu is and all that needs to be done is to 
analyse what this principle entails in various situations.
82
 Ramose responds to this formulation 
in a tellingly titled paper, ‘But Hans Kelsen was not born in Africa: a reply to Thaddeus Metz’ 
(2007). Ramose contends that Metz’s principle fails to capture what ubuntu is precisely 
because the method he used to arrive at it and indeed its very formulation is allochthonous, or 
‘not from Africa’.  Now, it may be easy to brush what Ramose says aside: South Africa is, 
after all, a composite place, and Western thought has permeated the place, or at least occupies 
a significant position in this place. Yet we should be sensitive to what Ramose has to say if 
we are to take doing philosophy-in-place seriously, even if we do not accept his complete 
dismissal of Metz’s project. 
Janz asks us to engage with place in a process that he calls ‘Listening and Speaking’ 
(2009). Listening and speaking requires that we favour the theoretical frameworks developed 
within a place to engage with a place. We may, after some time investigating the theoretical 
frameworks of a place, find that they need to be adjusted in order to better bring out what 
matters in a place. But we ought not to favour using theoretical frameworks developed in 
other places for highlighting what matters in a particular place. In his 2012 paper, Janz 
develops the idea that importing concepts (and, it follows, theoretical frameworks) from other 
places will always result in a fundamental misunderstanding; this misunderstanding may 
prove to be useful, interesting and even highlight previously unthought-of aspects, but it 
remains a misunderstanding. As a misunderstanding it fails to represent what matters in this 
place. Consider another example of a misunderstanding: You would like to understand 
‘brotherly love’ in the Christian tradition of philosophy. You may choose between reading St 
Augustine, C.S. Lewis and Kierkegaard on one hand, or Marxian or psychoanalytical texts on 
the other. No doubt, the latter provide a worthwhile understanding of the concept, but they 
remain misunderstandings: they are re-readings of Christian thought. We ought to prefer 
Christian writers in this case as their theoretical frameworks are designed to highlight what 
matters in the Christian place. Marxian or psychoanalytical texts highlight other salient 
features of brotherly love that arguably only become salient in another place –for example, the 
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 Of course, Metz is careful to spell out what is meant by ‘harmony’ so that it better captures what he takes to 
be African normative intuitions, including positive commitments towards others in the community.  
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place of the oppressed proletariat revolting against the religious authorities in Europe in 1848. 
If one were to ‘listen and speak’ with the Christian place, one ought to favour the writings of 
Kierkegaard over those of Marx – although we may find that what Marx has to say about 
Christianity is more relevant to our place. 
How, then, should we understand Ramose’s criticism of Metz’s project? Metz 
certainly wants to develop a distinctively African concept, so he is not acting in bad faith. 
Instead, Metz is a clear example of someone who is trapped by a hermeneutic bias. For Metz, 
a moral theory ought to be presented in terms of a deontological principle which neatly 
explains the moral nature of any given action. This is a bias to which he would appeal when 
analysing a concept as a potential moral theory – and in attempting to analyse a concept as a 
potential moral theory, he is forced to reread it in the terms of a deontological principle. 
Ramose refers to such a principle as a ‘Grundnorm’, and maintains that such a formulation is 
so foreign to African cultures that it cannot successfully convey what ubuntu is (2007). 
Following Janz’s preference for listening and speaking (2009), I agree with Ramose, but 
maintain that Metz’s misunderstanding remains interesting and worthwhile reading for a 
student of ubuntu – though as a secondary text. By stating ubuntu in terms of a Grundnorm, 
we necessarily force ubuntu to communicate with another place and ignore the potential of 
this place for explaining ubuntu. By advocating that we see Metz (2007) as providing us with 
a rereading of ubuntu, I advocate pluralism when considering the validity of theoretical 
frameworks. In principle, several mutually exclusive frameworks can correctly convey what is 
meaningful about a phenomenon, just as different people may provide several mutually 
exclusive, but accurate descriptions of a painting. However, if we want a fundamental 
understanding of a concept, we must favour a theoretical framework developed in that place. 
Thus, we ought to prefer South African theoretical frameworks of analysing ubuntu (and, by 
extension, the South African place). 
But herein lies a problem. The South African place is not analogous to the Christian 
place discussed above: with the Christian place, we have a rich tradition of writers who are 
well acquainted with the place; in South Africa we do not have such a tradition. African 
philosophy is unwritten until the second half of the 20
th
 century (see Hallen, 2009). Older 
forms of orally transmitted African philosophy suffered heavy losses with the disruption of 
African traditions and family life brought about by colonisation and Apartheid.
83
 The 
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 One of the major mechanisms of 20
th
 century white economic domination was a system which necessitated 
migrant labour (see Terreblanche, 2002). By doing so, this system effectively and, arguably permanently, 
destroyed African family structures.  
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disruption of oral traditions and the lack of written traditions mean that we can only speculate 
as to traditional African critical methods in what has since become South Africa. Furthermore, 
academic writing since colonisation has pointedly mimicked European and American 
methods of analysis, and thus has remained an extension of the European place in Africa, 
rather than becoming part of the South African place. It has failed to become part of the 
composite place of South Africa because it has unconsciously adhered to the universalist 
conceptions of thought outlined above, and not designed it methods to bring out what matters 
in the South African place. So, unlike when dealing with Christian concepts, we do not have a 
standing tradition of philosophy-in-place from which to assume critical methods. Nor should 
we prefer traditional African methods for understanding current South Africa or current South 
African philosophical concepts. This place is composite and, while the various places in South 
Africa are difficult to access, they influence and shape each other. If Western methods 
fundamentally misunderstand our place and the concepts therein, purely African methods are 
bound to do the same. Ideally, we ought to prefer methods whose provenance is composite in 
the same way that our place is composite. To date, no such methods exist. 
That we have only a limited corpus of thought written from within the South African 
place has important ramifications for a project such as this one. In writing about the South 
African place, identifying certain features as mysteries and taking mysteries to be the salient 
features to which philosophy responds, I have my own hermeneutic methodological biases. 
My biases are (mostly unconsciously) informed by my academic training which is 
predominantly Western, and the literature to which I have exposed myself, especially Janz 
who writes from Western place. Even when I have included writings from African places, 
they run the risk of being nothing more than interesting, useful misunderstanding. My own 
work is, it follows, like all current South African philosophy: at best, an interesting and useful 
misunderstanding of our place. But, as all current South African philosophy cannot be more 
than an interesting, useful misunderstanding of our place, we have nothing to prefer over it.  
Fortunately, we need not relegate all South African philosophy to being a 
misunderstanding. Janz argues that concepts and writings about a place become part of a place 
(2012). As we write and investigate the South African place, gradually our methods and 
concepts will become part of the South African place. Of course, if we continue to practice 
philosophy in such a way that it is not sensitive to the features of this place, we risk 
perpetuating the fragmentation of the South African place. However, if we focus on the South 
African place and consciously tailor our methods to represent what matters in this place, we 
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will develop methods of analysis that become increasingly able to represent this place. In this 
way, we build a philosophical tradition which is both distinctive and successful.  
In the meantime, South African writers need to be aware of the constant risk that they 
misunderstand place. When we apply a Sartrean analysis of racism in South African, for 
instance, it must be with the understanding that the analysis must still be adapted to our place 
and that our first attempts will essentially be a re-reading of place – one which highlights new 
and different aspects of race in South Africa, but one which will not entirely capture what 
matters about race in South Africa. Only by continually reshaping our biases and by reshaping 
the South African place by writing about it will we develop methods that could represent what 
matters in the South African place with regards to race. Despite being bound to misunderstand 
our place, it is only by representing our place that we are able to come to know it. 
 
Writing about Mysteries and Where to from Here  
The two mysteries outlined in this chapter are by no means exhaustive. Part of the reason for 
this is simply the space constraint that I have in writing this thesis. But there is a more 
purposeful reason for not giving a comprehensive list of the mysteries in the South African 
place. The mystery of the fragmentation of our place is central to all other place-specific 
mysteries in South Africa. By exploring this mystery itself, we will be forced to explore the 
other mysteries of this place. Now, we may disagree about what these mysteries are, and this 
will lead to a more in-depth discussion of the South African place. But this discussion needs 
to happen outside of this thesis. So, instead of giving a comprehensive list of the other 
mysteries, I propose that they be discovered by focussing on the fragmentation of the South 
African place.  
Having related the other mysteries to the fragmentation of place, we should not 
assume that a solution to one is a solution to all. Indeed, each of these mysteries will require 
its own rigorous investigation and debate, using both methods developed for this place 
(primarily) and methods developed for other places. We may discover that ubuntu works well 
as a civic religion, but by itself is insufficient to deal with the phenomenology of race and 
racialisation. If, on the other hand, ubuntu does provide us with the conceptual tools for 
dealing with race and racialisation, it must be shown. Fortunately, this gives us space to 
develop an interesting body of literature concerning philosophy in a South African place. 
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 Chapter 4 
 
Reconceptualisation of Ubuntu 
In this thesis, I have argued that philosophy in South Africa has been practiced poorly. As a 
concept, ubuntu is the clearest example of the failures of South African philosophy. These 
failures come about because philosophical projects are subsumed by a more pervasive, 
political project: to show Africa (more specifically, South Africa) to be a locus of intellectual 
worth. Instead of dismissing this political project, I propose that we work within its 
constraints to recreate an interesting, distinctive tradition of philosophy. In order to do this, 
we need to be able to show that concepts themselves, and by extension philosophy, have a 
place. The claim that ubuntu is either essentially African or an untranslatable African concept 
fails to show ubuntu to be of philosophical worth. For this reason, I suggest that we consider 
Janz’s re-conceptualisation of philosophy: that all philosophy is contingent on place. When 
we situate philosophy as contingent on a particular place, we are able to adjust the criteria for 
successful philosophy. By showing that the criteria for a successful philosophical project are 
connected to a place, we are able to fulfil the political demands placed on ubuntu without 
compromising its philosophical integrity.  
Let us briefly recount the criteria I gave for us to consider a concept to be successful in 
Chapter 1: 
1. Distinctiveness; 
2. Consistent usage; 
3. Rigour, or a concern for accuracy; 
4. Interestingness; and  
5. Sustainability, or the existence of a prolonged debate. 
A successful philosophical concept should satisfy all of these criteria, though successful 
concepts can, over time, become unsuccessful as the debate around them wanes, or shifts 
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towards something else. If we accept Janz’s model of philosophy, we are able to add more 
substance to these criteria. A concept is granted distinctiveness, in part, because it responds to 
a distinctive place. Because it responds to a distinctive place, a concept must be so designed 
as to bring out what matters in its particular place. Thus, it would be engineered distinctively 
from any similar concepts in other places. Place also provides motivation for consistent usage 
and rigour. This is because a concept responds to a particular mystery which has persistent 
features. The persistence of these features guarantee that the concept be used with a base-
level of consistency. That a mystery presents us with an existential challenge provides us 
with immediate motivation to find a rigorous and practical understanding of it: anything less 
would not diminish its existential challenge. A concept is interesting because it relates to our 
place in a particular way: it promises to give us tools for dealing with one or more of the 
mysteries in this place. But we must be careful; by ‘promise’ I do not mean that the concept 
actually gives us the tools for dealing with our mysteries. Rather, promise is a more like a 
hunch; it is an intuitive (but often wrong) reflex identification of potentially useful features. 
A concept remains interesting so long as we find that we can use it to deal with our mysteries, 
and loses its interestingness when we discover that it cannot help us.
84
 Finally, the persistence 
of mysteries and the fact that place changes slowly guarantees us of sustained debates when 
we conduct philosophy-in-place. Of course, places change over time. As places change, 
concepts applicable to a place during one period can become inapplicable to the same place 
in a different period. When a concept becomes inapplicable, it may be adapted to the new 
place depending on the nature of the concept itself and the context of the concept, or it may 
fail to adapt. If it fails to adapt, we may relegate it to historical studies, or we may continue to 
use it as something of a vestigial feature of our philosophical tradition. A philosophical 
concept that is successful of a long period time should have adapted to different places 
throughout different times.  
By situating philosophy in place, we are able to add a sixth criterion for successful 
philosophy: 
6. A philosophical tradition is good if is provides us with an accurate fundamental 
understanding of our place. 
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 At this point, it may be necessary to recall that Marcel held that philosophy is an ongoing process, as opposed 
to a finished result. Once a mystery is dealt with and no longer presents us with a threat, we no longer conduct 
philosophy when considering it. Instead, it falls into the realm of history and the study of past ideas. So a 
successful concept can become uninteresting when the mystery it deals with no longer presents us with an 
existential challenge. 
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By giving a fundamental understanding of our place, I mean that the concepts and logic used 
by a tradition must be able to give us models which 
a. Allow us to explain current and past phenomena in this place in terms of abstract 
principles; and/or 
b. Are able to act as predictive models for future phenomena; and/or 
c. Are able to give us normative standards for interacting with our place. 
By accuracy,
85
 I mean to add an open-ended truth clause. It is necessary that a philosophical 
tradition have a truth (or reality tracking) clause if it is to give us any understanding of our 
place. However, just what it means to be truthful or reality-tracking is something that a 
philosophical project by its very nature defines as it engages with its place. I assume, 
nevertheless, that whether a project is truthful/reality-tracking will be revealed through 
continual application and investigation of the project itself. This criterion is meant to weed 
out harmful, exclusionist philosophical traditions, such as a philosophical basis for racism. 
We need to avoid having to credit harmful traditions with philosophical success, because by 
their harm and exclusivity they have shown themselves not to be able to account for at least 
one set of phenomena: namely, the human condition of the excluded Other. A good 
philosophical tradition needs to be able to account for as many phenomena as possible, as 
accurate to what matters to each viewpoint as possible.
86
  
Having recounted what would make a philosophical concept or tradition successful, it 
will not be my aim to show that ubuntu will be successful. Criterion (5) is not something that 
we can know about a concept beforehand. Rather, what I aim to show here is that ubuntu 
could be a successful philosophical concept. I do this by first locating the South African 
mystery to which ubuntu is best suited as a response and then showing that its possible 
response to this mystery is distinctive and interesting. It follows also that, should ubuntu fail 
to be successful, we have the criteria in this thesis to develop another successful, distinctly 
South African philosophical tradition of thought. Naturally, we are talking about ubuntu as a 
concept adapted to this place. We therefore need to engage in some cherry-picking, but as I 
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 It is important to differentiate between (3) a concern for accuracy and (6) accuracy itself. (3) tells us about the 
mental states of the philosophers engaged in the project; (6) tells us about the project itself. In principle, we are 
able to know (3) at the time of investigation; (6), however, becomes apparent with the passage of time, or with 
application. 
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 This constraint does not amount to saying that every viewpoint is equally valid. Rather, it is obvious that some 
viewpoints are misguided or intentionally ignorant of features of their place. A good philosophical tradition 
should, however, be able to explain how this disconnect arises while being able to identify what matters for 
these viewpoints. 
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have argued not adapting ubuntu to this place would relegate it to the history of ideas, and 
would not be a proper, critical philosophical engagement with our place. 
 
The Mystery and What This Place Needs 
The central mystery of the South African place is that it is fragmented. (I assume that ubuntu 
is not immediately useful in dealing with the second mystery mentioned in the previous 
chapter). In the previous chapter, I mention that Mangcu suggests that ubuntu is a response to 
the lack of a civic religion in South Africa. I take it that the lack of a civic religion is 
precisely what characterises the fragmentation of place. Mangcu holds that what is needed to 
deal with the fragmentation of place is a civic religion, that is, a set of generally shared (and 
officially endorsed) values that govern interactions between people with different conceptions 
of the good life. The question then that we need to ask is: Can ubuntu be modified to play the 
role of a civic religion in South Africa? By mapping out what a civic religion is and what 
particular constraints our mystery places on a civic religion, we will have outlined the basic 
shape that ubuntu needs to take to be successful.  
The concept of a civic religion was first developed by Rousseau in The Social 
Contract (1762). Rousseau proposes a solution to a different place’s mysteries: the place of 
Enlightenment Europe’s clash of religions and the rise of an economically mobile middle 
class in formerly feudal states. His civic religion was more of a religious concept, requiring 
theistic beliefs and allowing the state to determine the articles of faith to be shared by 
everyone. Despite these very place-specific features, we are able to import certain features of 
his concept to our place. Importing his concept is possible because of certain similarities 
between our places: both are in a time of transition, and both lack a unifying ethos. However, 
we need to be careful how we adapt Rousseau’s concept to our place. So we must be selective 
in our rereading of Rousseau. Let us then define what a civil religion so that it best suits our 
place. 
A civic religion is the implicit basis of a social contract between people with different 
conceptions of the good life. In determining what actions are permissible and what principles 
are to govern interactions between people, contractors must make use of a set of shared 
values with a common conception of how these values relate to each other. Common 
candidates for these values include dignity, freedom and equality because respecting them 
tends to make conversation between the different parties possible. Contractors may decide 
that some values are to be prioritized over others, and even that certain values are non-
negotiable and cannot be compromised. Or they may not. What determines the best set of 
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values and their arrangement in a civic religion is nothing more than the combination that 
best allows for a conversation in a particular place. The emphasis on hermeneutics and 
practicality as the justifying features of a civic religion usually de-prioritises any 
metaphysical considerations.
87
 Different parties may espouse different metaphysics, but a 
civic religion which relies too heavily on a particular set of metaphysical assumptions would 
have no or little coercive force over many of the contractors. Rousseau was especially 
careful, despite his emphasis on a theistic metaphysics, to leave his metaphysical basis as 
vague as possible. I will therefore assume that a civic religion with overly particular 
metaphysical convictions is going to be too exclusive to be successful in providing cohesion 
in South Africa. This assumption rules out using any particular religious commitments to the 
existence of a God, gods or ancestors, as each of these entities is doubted by at least some 
groups in South Africa. Instead, successful candidates for a civic religion ought to focus more 
on ethical and practical values. 
In summary, a civic religion is defined for our purposes as a set of agreed upon social 
values which facilitate mutually beneficial interaction (and mediate conflict) between people 
with different conceptions of the good life. Crucially, the values of a civic religion 
fundamentally determine which actions are permissible and which are impermissible within a 
society, thus setting the minimum standard for taking part in a society. It may be thought that 
a civic religion as it has been defined is still insufficient to counter the fragmentation of place 
in South Africa. After all, South Africans may need motivation to adopt the ethical values of 
a civic religion if the value of living in a mixed place is questionable. Mangcu suggests that a 
civic religion should also foster a foundational shared identity among the different groups in 
the contract (2001). In the case of Rousseau’s civic religion, such an identity could be 
formulated around religious belief itself. Though the South African place does not lend itself 
to a religious base identity, there may be a broader sense of identity that can be appealed to. 
By emphasising a shared identity, we are able to provide an incentive against othering 
members of the contract. (Othering is undesirable as it acts as a basis for exclusionary actions 
and policies, such as apartheid itself).
88
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 Notably, Rousseau required theism as a feature of his civic religion (1762). Bertram points out that Rousseau 
did not believe that atheists could be trusted to respect the values of a social contract (2012). False as this may 
be, it is likely that people at Rousseau’s time would not have generally found his point disagreeable given the 
pervasiveness of religious sentiment at the time. 
88 I take it that what Mangcu (2001) and I refer to as a civic religion has a much narrower sense than is 
commonly referred to by sociologists and political scientists. My use of the term refers to the tailored version 
above, not necessarily including state-perpetuated dogmas and rituals. 
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It must be stressed that a civic religion is not a philosophy. If we develop ubuntu as a 
civic religion, then we will develop it as a set of practical values, or perhaps a lived 
‘philosophy’. At the level of civic religion, ubuntu does not represent the level of critical 
thought generally practiced in academic philosophy. However, it provides a foundational set 
of intuitions and norms that can be refined into critical ethical and moral thought. I shall 
discuss how these institutions and norms develop into a philosophy later. At this point, 
however, it is sufficient to point out that ubuntu does provide just such norms and intuitions, 
but as I will argue below, these norms and intuitions apply to the wrong place. We need to 
consciously reconstruct ubuntu according to this place. In doing this, we will be able to 
provide a new set of norms and intuitions to refine into a philosophy.  
It could be argued that we already have a civic religion in the form of liberalism. If so, 
and it is successful, then it makes little sense to propose ubuntu as a civic religion. However, 
the fragmentation of place persists, despite nearly twenty years of liberal democracy. We 
must admit that liberalism has failed to become the right civic religion for our place. By 
looking at how it has failed, we may be able to engineer our use of ubuntu to formulate a 
better response to the mystery. 
 
The Official Response: Liberalism 
Jordan tells us that the parties in the CODESA talks settled on liberalism as the best means of 
protecting the interests of the vastly different (but conservative) parties involved in the talks 
(2012: 31). These parties therefore settled on liberalism not because they recognized the 
values assumed in it as fundamental, but simply because it allowed them to have a 
conversation. The South African Constitution became one of the best articulated liberal 
documents in recent history, accepted by political parties (and a people) largely distrustful of 
liberalism. Following the pattern that Rawls set, the Constitution aims to allow different 
people with different conceptions of the good to coexist peacefully in the same place. Rawls 
ordered his two principles such that freedom from coercion is prioritised over equality, or 
social cohesion for that matter (1972). The South African Constitution reflects this 
prioritisation: for example, land reform is encouraged, but is only allowed to happen with the 
consent of the current owner of the land. Thus, the property rights of citizens are prioritised 
over the value of equality. 
Mangcu characterises the liberal approach of the Constitution as one which promotes 
tolerance (2001: 20). Tolerance is the virtue of finding a practical balance between 
liberalism’s two central values: liberty and equality. In a liberal society, tolerance amounts to 
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minimal interference with the rights and the conception of the good of any particular group, 
and is the guiding principle for inter-group interactions. Tolerance is a desirable feature of a 
civic religion: it protects the contractors from being needlessly disadvantaged by the social 
contract. Without tolerance, we are faced with an exclusionary civic religion which promotes 
the exclusion of particular groups. So tolerance is a desirable feature for South Africa’s civic 
religion.  
However, tolerance by itself is insufficient to respond to a fragmented place. At best, 
it can promote an uneasy truce between the parties. There are two reasons for tolerance being 
insufficient to deal with the fragmentation of place in South Africa: 1) liberal values are 
poorly received by most South Africans, and 2) tolerance is unable to present an inclusive 
civic religion as desirable.  
Firstly, tolerance has become intrinsically linked with South African law in the minds 
of the people. At best, the law can prevent the expression of certain intolerant attitudes. South 
Africa has an excellent legal system for enforcing tolerance insofar as expressions of 
intolerance are punished. However, in a country with a long history of civil disobedience, the 
coercion of the law hardly stands as a marker of moral rightness in the eyes of the people. 
Similarly, although the political powers of the country eventually settled on liberalism and 
tolerance as means of ending the stalemate during the CODESA talks, this has been 
insufficient to convince most South Africans to adopt tolerant liberalism as a nationally 
expressed civic religion. The disconnect between the ‘official’ values and virtues of the state, 
and the perceived values and virtues of majority people in South African can be seen in the 
high crime rate of South Africa. Steven Pinker argues that countries with a low acceptance of 
the moral, legal or political order display a high crime rate (2011: 84). South Africa is known 
for especially intolerant crimes such as ‘corrective’ rape against gender nonconforming 
individuals, and xenophobia. In a country with high levels of distrust of legal and political 
powers, the virtue of tolerance is seen as being imposed from without, and not as the moral 
foundation of society. 
Secondly and more fundamentally, tolerance cannot make continuing in a social 
contract desirable itself. Rather, it assumes that the contract is already desirable. In South 
Africa, as I discussed in the previous chapter, it is not clear whether or not the social contract 
between the various groups in our country is desirable, primarily because it is associated with 
an unjust provenance. By toting tolerance alone as a public virtue, legislative and political 
powers will not be able to show the current mixture of people in South Africa to be desirable. 
As a result, tolerance can do nothing to overcome the fragmentation of place. If we are left 
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with only tolerance as the guiding virtue of interactions in South Africa, we risk having a 
short-lived social contract between the various groups. Furthermore, if people begin to 
question the liberal foundations of our country’s legal system, tolerance may even become an 
undesirable virtue, associated with keeping in place an undesirable social structure. A 
successful civic religion in South Africa would have to show a contract between the current 
groups of people in South Africa to be desirable in spite of its unjust history. For this reason, 
it is necessary to adopt either further values or virtues of negotiating values as part of our 
civic religion. It is this need that gives us the space to consider ubuntu as a practical 
philosophical concept. Ubuntu, it appears, may be able to act as both an additional set of 
values value and another virtue for negotiating competing values. 
 
Which Ubuntu? 
Although Mangcu does not explore the issue in detail, his article (2001) suggests that ubuntu 
could provide us with other values and virtues of negotiating these values. If so, then we have 
in principle a concept which can help us build a civic religion, and from which we can refine 
a philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, we must be clear about how we ought to approach the 
concept. As stated in the Preliminary Remarks of this thesis, ubuntu is a contested concept: 
there are many differing conceptions of ubuntu currently in the literature. There are therefore 
some conceptions of ubuntu that will not work as a civic religion because they are 
overcommitted to beliefs and values which are not commonly held.  
For writers such as Ramose (2002) and Keevey (2009), ubuntu inevitably has 
metaphysical commitments, specifically tied to traditional African religious and social 
systems. Furthermore, Keevey points to the social structure of communities, which explicitly 
espouse ubuntu, as undesirable due to their being patriarchal (2009). If ubuntu has such 
implicit particular metaphysical and outdated moral commitments, it does not seem that it 
could be a civic religion for a multicultural place such as South Africa.
89
 The only way an 
ubuntu with these sorts of commitments could become a civic religion is if one were to 
exclude all dissenting peoples from the South African place: a project which bears significant 
similarities with the apartheid project. 
But can we really ever re-apply the ubuntu of pre-European incursion to present-day 
South Africa? According to Janz’s (2012) philosophy of place, it is impossible to replicate 
the concept. The South African place is irrevocably altered; the passage of time alone means 
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 Arguably, an ubuntu with these sorts of commitments belongs rather in the category of the history of ideas – a 
fascinating engagement with a historical place, but hardly suitable to present-day South Africa. 
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that we are dealing with a different place to pre-incursion Africa. Present-day South Africa 
has many more (and much more diverse) people groups coexisting against a history of 
violence and oppression. For any possible conception of ubuntu, we would necessarily be re-
reading the concept in a different place if we were to apply it today. By re-reading the 
concept, we highlight different features of it and suppress other features, such that it becomes 
different. This is because concept and place exist in a dialectic, each influencing how the 
other is being understood. It is therefore impossible to replicate the concept as it existed in 
previous places: we must ‘tailor’ the concept to this place. Even purists who aim to import an 
authentic, ‘as-it-was’ conception of ubuntu are forced to reread the concept according to the 
constraints and contingencies of this, present place. The only real decision then is how 
conscious we will be of our tailoring the concept. It stands to reason that being conscious of 
how we reread a concept is better as we can have more control over how the concept 
develops.  
I am not arguing for radical constructivism, or that we can do whatever we like with a 
concept. Like places, concepts have continuity: if we alter them too much, too quickly, they 
become unrecognisable and lose their meaning. Rather, we need to balance the changes 
required by rereading a concept in a different place with the need for continuity. This balance 
is best achieved by being both explicitly selective in our rereading of ubuntu and sensitive to 
what is taken to be central to a concept. Due to the constraint of continuity, it is not clear 
whether or not we will be able to rid ubuntu of its metaphysical basis. Almost all writers on 
ubuntu today admit that what makes ubuntu distinctive is its commitment to certain 
statements about being human (or human ontology). For example, the statement, ‘Umntu 
ngumntu ngabantu’ (‘A person is/becomes a person through [other] people’) has become one 
of the most common formulations of ubuntu. The statement has some obvious ontological 
commitments, namely that a necessary feature of being human is that the being is situated in 
a network of relationships with other human beings. Furthermore, the statement also appears 
to imply a connection between metaphysical states and normative demands on people. To 
reject either of these commitments as integral to ubuntu would be to stretch the concept too 
far and would result in meaning-destructive discontinuity between the older concept and the 
rereading. It becomes apparent then, that ubuntu will have to retain some metaphysical 
commitments despite civic religions generally not having metaphysical commitments. 
Do ubuntu’s metaphysical commitments mean that it is unsuitable as a civic religion? 
Not necessarily so. Remember that the reason civic religions avoid overly particular 
metaphysical commitments is that they tend to exclude too many of the contractors’ 
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conceptions of the good. If, however, ubuntu’s metaphysical convictions are general enough 
not to exclude too many other metaphysical convictions, they do not prevent it from being a 
civic religion. Rather, they relate the practical ethical values of a civic religion to some very 
basic assumptions about being human. Part of the future philosophy written on ubuntu then 
must show that ubuntu’s metaphysical convictions are general and compatible with multiple 
particular metaphysical convictions. As a rereading, future philosophy on ubuntu should be 
selective against the particular, rich metaphysical convictions of a traditionalist conception of 
ubuntu. Nevertheless, it should be careful to preserve continuity of the general metaphysical 
convictions of ubuntu.  
Notice that the imprecise nature of these metaphysical commitments is grounds for 
further, fruitful philosophical engagement, rather than the rejection of the concept. What we 
want in ubuntu at this level is not a fully cashed out conception, but rather one that prompts 
future investigation by promising to provide a solution to our mystery(ies). For now it is 
enough to say that ubuntu has metaphysical commitments which relate the human moral 
being to the metaphysical nature of being human. Already, these bland commitments give us 
some extra values, and provide the basis for a shared identity. For example, ubuntu stresses 
the value of being human, especially as a socially situated and communally dependent being. 
By stressing the value of the being itself, and not its constituent features (e.g. liberty, 
autonomy and moral equality), ubuntu is able to place greater demands on us than simply that 
we be tolerant of each other. It is these extra demands that show ubuntu to be interesting. 
 
Why Is Ubuntu Interesting? 
Having discussed the mystery that ubuntu responds to (the fragmentation of place), the type 
of concept that ubuntu should be seen as (a concept tailored as a civic religion) and how we 
are to view ubuntu (careful rereading), what remains is to show how ubuntu could provide a 
novel and interesting response to our mystery. Liberalism fails because it only promotes 
tolerance as a virtue for dealing with composite places, and tolerance is not enough. What 
could ubuntu offer that liberalism does not?  
Mangcu mentions what is lacking in the South African place: he calls it ‘respect’ 
(2001: 20). Mangcu suggests that respect amounts to taking an active interest in the other’s 
projects, aims and goals. Mangcu’s notes on respect are sparse, but give us something 
interesting to investigate. It is apparent that respect does not amount to an uncritical 
acceptance of the projects, aims and goals: if it were, it would not be respect of an 
intelligible, morally equal human being. Rather, proper respect for another human being is 
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the desire to understand and empathise with the agent that pursues these projects, and a 
predisposition to evaluate another favourably. Importantly, respect is attitudinal. Thus agents 
that respect others are motivated to act from their own beliefs about the other, rather than 
simple obedience to the law. The difference between tolerance and respect is neatly 
illustrated by two different attitudes towards different languages. A person who tolerates the 
different languages in her place will not interfere with them being spoken, but need not have 
an active interest in learning these languages. A person who respects the different languages 
in her place is eager to learn these languages to understand their speakers. She may, after 
having a conversation with her neighbours, decide that some are misguided in their 
descriptions of certain thing, but when she makes this judgement she does so from a position 
of understanding.  
The language example highlights an important feature of respect. Respect is 
supererogatory. It cannot be mandated in any legal code (such as the Constitution) – the 
individual must willingly decide to adopt it as an attitude towards others. Instead, respect is 
manifested when the agent is willing to go beyond what is required of her. By respecting the 
different people involved in this fragmented place, South Africans start to work against the 
fragmentation of place in South Africa. Agents who respect each other will be interested in 
learning about each other’s place(s). As they do so, what were mutually unintelligible places 
become progressively more understandable to each other. In this way, the foundational 
phenomenon leading to fragmentation (otherness) starts to fade.  
The question is: can ubuntu offer us the virtue of respect? We have good reason to 
believe that ubuntu can. By stressing the value of being human as a social being, ubuntu 
provides incentive for taking the projects of another seriously. Tutu describes how ubuntu 
prizes empathy as the most moral emotion, and the lack thereof as the sign of moral depravity 
(1999: 32). Empathy may refer primarily to an emotional response to another, but it also 
requires that we take the other’s projects into account. An empathetic person is one who 
would want to understand why a person feels the way she does. In order to do that, she needs 
to have the sort of respect outlined above. Ubuntu, then, absolutely requires respect.  
To say that ubuntu requires respect is to make an interesting claim about 
supererogation. Put in another way, ubuntu requires that we act beyond what is required. This 
may seem strange, but consider a familiar example from traditional African thought that 
illustrates this: the relationship between host and guest. Ubuntu is often illustrated by 
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referring to the imperative to look after guests.
90
 It can be characterised as ‘host’ ethic. 
Traditionally, a person with ubuntu would willingly take in a stranger as a guest for as long as 
she needs, providing food and shelter for her. The guest is not obliged to return any favours, 
nor would people say the host has ubuntu if he asks for something in return. However, if the 
guest is a ‘good guest’, or empathises with her host, she will do her bit to help with the 
household chores during her stay. In present-day terms, she may offer to help clean the dishes 
after the meals or make her bed in the morning. Doing such supererogatory acts willingly and 
without second thought shows the guest also to have ubuntu. The relationship between the 
host and the guest breaks down if one of them refuses to take part in supererogatory acts. 
Consider that a guest who offers nothing in return for her stay is hardly invited back.  
One could translate the principle behind this local example to a much larger, more 
serious example from South Africa’s history: the non-violent change-over to black majority 
rule in 1994. Let us assume that Tutu was correct in connecting many black South Africans’ 
decision to relinquish their rights to retribution and radical redistribution with ubuntu: it was 
a supererogatory act carried out with the aim of fostering an empathetic, respectful 
connection with white South Africans.
91
As it was a supererogatory act, it could not be 
followed by any move to oblige white South Africans to take steps towards their black 
counterparts. Hence, no mass reparations were required from white South Africans in 
general. Nevertheless, for ubuntu to have continued becoming the civic religion in South 
Africa, white South Africans needed to continue by taking part in further supererogatory acts. 
These acts should have taken into account the immensely unequal distribution of social and 
economic goods between white and black South Africans. By not reciprocating, white South 
Africans have shown themselves to be uninterested in taking part in a respectful community 
with black South Africans. In order for ubuntu to work as a civic religion, white South 
Africans need to engage in respectful, supererogatory exchanges with their black compatriots. 
What we have in ubuntu then is a potential civic religion that shows promise as a 
philosophical concept. As a civic religion, ubuntu may able to make living in a composite 
place desirable for South Africans. By stressing respect and the value of being human as a 
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 Cf., Nelson Mandela responding to questions by Tim Modise in The Ubuntu Experience.ogg, Canonical, Ltd. 
24 May 2006. Retrieved from Wikipedia, URL =<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubuntu_%28philosophy%29> on 
20 August 2013, 22h40. 
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 Although it is plausibly argued that South Africans opted for a peaceful transition in order to protect the 
economy, we do not see this pattern emerging in other recently liberated countries. Countries like Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Kenya forcibly expelled their white oppressors with little thought for the economic repercussions. 
One must assume that some non-economic consideration was at play in South Africa to allow for a peaceful 
transition. 
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social being, ubuntu is able to do what liberalism could not: show that it is desirable to live in 
a mixed-place South Africa, despite the morally tainted provenance of this mixture. Of 
course, how this is to happen must be spelled out in greater detail. It is particularly worrisome 
that ubuntu cannot be mandated by the state through courts of law. But there may be other 
ways of instilling ubuntu as a civic religion. Cashing out the possible ways in which ubuntu 
can be instilled as a civic religion, and what its values and virtues are is a project that should 
shape future South African philosophy. On a more abstract level, however, ubuntu shows 
promise as an analytical philosophical concept. Once we develop the values and virtues of 
ubuntu, we can start to analyse current phenomena in these terms. I have given a rough sketch 
of using ubuntu as an analytic tool above. By using ubuntu as an analytic tool, we are able to 
refine it as a South African philosophical concept which can be applied to multiple places, 
and potentially be universalised. 
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 Coda: Where to From Here? 
 
Ending a Prolegomenon 
The aim of this thesis has been to provide a prolegomenon to South African philosophy. As 
such, it does not seem that I should finish it with a ‘conclusion’ as such, but rather with notes 
on where to go from here. The aim of this coda is to provide the reader with an overview of 
the questions and structure that should be taken away from this thesis. 
I have focused on ubuntu as a clear example of a South African philosophical 
concept. However, the underlying intention of this paper has been to provide a model for 
developing any South African philosophical concept. To this extent, one needs to recognise 
that the model provided in the last chapter should serve mainly as a guideline, and should not 
dictate the development of any or every South African philosophical concept. The central, 
and only essential, feature of my proposed model is that the concept be developed by 
applying it to this place and its mysteries. We may find that ubuntu does not become a 
successful philosophy (though I have shown that it has the potential to do so), or that ubuntu 
ought not to become a civic religion, or that the best response to the fragmentation of place is 
not the creation of a civic religion. In each of these cases, however, we find that the political 
imperative explained in the first chapter remains the same: we must find a concept that 
undoes the de-intellectualisation of the South African place. My aim has been to suggest how 
we are to meet this imperative without sacrificing philosophical integrity.  
Despite the doubt cast over the exact details of my sketch of ubuntu’s development as 
a philosophical concept, it is still worth our while to consider some further points about this 
sketch. If ubuntu is to become a civic religion, we need to consider several questions about 
how this should happen. I will consider two such questions in this coda. The first is how a 
generally held civic religion can become a philosophical concept in use of specialists, such as 
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philosophers. The second follows from the first question: how might we, and ought we, 
instate civic religion? The second question is concerned with the practical issues of this 
prolegomenon, but practical issues are no less important than the theory covered throughout 
the thesis. If we cannot practically implement the model outlined in this prolegomenon, we 
are no closer to solving the problem outlined in Chapter 1. As with the rest of this thesis, the 
coda can be nothing more than a sketch, which I hope will provide a framework for future 
philosophical discussion in South Africa.  
 
 
First Consideration: How a Civic Religion Can Become a Philosophical Concept 
In the previous chapter, I outlined how ubuntu might become a civic religion in South Africa. 
Of course, a civic religion is not the same thing as a philosophical concept. However, 
philosophy and civic religions are interrelated. In order to better explain how making ubuntu 
a civic religion would aid us in creating a philosophical concept, let us consider how the two 
areas of thought relate to each other. 
The primary difference between a civic religion and a philosophical concept is the 
level of criticality with which each is held. Civic religions are values and beliefs widely held 
in an uncritical fashion; philosophical concepts on the other hand are used by a few 
academics and forever liable to be questioned. On the face of it, they are two vastly different 
fields of thought. While civic aspects of a civic religion may be analysed from time to time, 
they appear to be pervasive and to inform some of our most unconsciously held beliefs about 
right and wrong. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a highly conscious method of 
investigation. Ostensibly, values held in philosophy are those which can withstand critical 
scrutiny. Yet, upon closer investigation, it appears that philosophy in fact relies on a civic 
religion, or a fundamental set of assumed and shared beliefs and values. Even in the critical 
questioning that is characteristic of philosophy, we must assume other values, beliefs or 
concepts. We may, for instance, question Mills’ utilitarianism, but we do so by appealing to a 
generally held conception of right and wrong, or even simply truth and falsity. Even when we 
further question these more basic concepts, we must appeal to some or other generally 
perceived value, perhaps authenticity for instance. So it seems that the critical engagement of 
philosophy must exist against a more mundane background of uncritically accepted values 
and beliefs. The converse, that philosophy does not start against a background of uncritically 
held beliefs and values, is a paralysing state of being in which nothing can be reasoned or 
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concluded. So, at best, philosophy can only get us to temporarily suspend certain beliefs or 
values while we find a better way to cash them out.  
Of course, not all uncritically accepted values and beliefs constitute a civic religion. 
They only do so when they are generally held and are used to produce cohesion between the 
various groups in a society. Nevertheless, it follows that philosophy’s relationship to a civic 
religion is the same as it would be to any set of uncritically accepted beliefs and values. 
Philosophy can both question the validity or usefulness of a specific civic religion and it can 
question the content of that civic religion, but it ultimately must assume some shared set of 
beliefs and values in order to operate, or have convincing conclusions. A civic religion, such 
as ubuntu, then can provide the base data and intuitions which we use both as the object of 
philosophy, and as the values and beliefs against which we test other objects.  
The model above explains both how a philosophy and civic religion relate once they 
are well established, but it can also explain how a philosophy can be developed out of a civic 
religion. Once a civic religion is in place, it begins to inform the standards by which we 
analyse concepts and phenomena. As it does so, the values and beliefs entailed in it set the 
various thresholds after which we may take an argument and its conclusion to be convincing. 
For instance, if we assume ubuntu as a civic religion, we will fairly uncritically assume that 
humans are basically interconnected and interdependent beings, and that this metaphysical 
fact about us dictates certain ethical imperatives. With ubuntu as a civic religion, we may 
consider an argument for an ethical imperative X (for example, that animals have direct 
rights). The argument will be considered weak if it fails to appeal to certain values held by 
ubuntu as a civic religion – for example, it fails to show that animals form a morally relevant 
part of the network that constitutes human beings. Conversely, the argument will be 
considered more convincing if it appeals to humans’ interconnected and interdependent 
nature. This is not to say that we cannot and ought not to be critical of the basic values and 
beliefs of ubuntu, but if ubuntu is to assume the place of a civic religion, the most convincing 
method of analysing ubuntu would be through its own critical apparatus, values and beliefs. 
For instance, if what Keevy (2009) maintains is true and patriarchy is an intrinsic feature of 
ubuntu, one may critically evaluate ubuntu-patriarchy through the other ethical imperatives 
generated by humans’ interconnectedness. What we see here is the ‘distillation’ of a civic 
religion into a philosophical tradition. The more the civic religion’s values and beliefs are 
used, and the more these values and beliefs themselves are evaluated in terms of the other 
features of the civic religion, the more rigorous a philosophical tradition we create. 
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By setting ubuntu up as a civic religion, we start a process that leads to ubuntu being 
‘distilled’ into a philosophical method of analysis. Therefore, arguing for ubuntu as a civic 
religion amounts to arguing for putting in place the conditions for ubuntu to develop into a 
robust philosophical tradition. We must, then, consider how feasible it is to create an 
artificial, self-conscious civic religion out of ubuntu. 
 
Creating a Civic Religion: The Practical and Ethical Feasibility of Instating Ubuntu 
As I have already mentioned, civic religions as political devices are uncritically held, and 
normally are not the product of conscious intervention. Consider for example Catholicism in 
Medieval Europe. Although the church fathers were conscious of spreading their religion, 
those that assumed the religion were not generally conscious of adopting a civic religion for 
the purposes of political cohesion. Rather, the focus of most of the converted was on the 
validity of Catholic Christianity’s values and beliefs.92 Instead, civic religions usually arise 
organically, without the conscious aim of making them civic religions.  
With this in mind, South Africa finds itself at a quandary. Nearly twenty years after 
the divisive political ideology of apartheid was removed from political power, we have as yet 
not managed to overcome the fragmentation of our place. Furthermore, it is uncertain that one 
will organically arise in the near future; we have as much chance of snapping back to another 
politically divisive ideology. So the question arises: is it possible to artificially instate a civic 
religion? On the face of it, the answer is, ‘Yes, but at what cost?’ Previous examples of 
artificial civic religions were often violently imposed, and were done so at the expense of 
critical thought. Consider the fascist ideologies of the early twentieth century. These 
ideologies themselves advocated horrendous civic values and beliefs, and they were 
successfully imposed through the rigorous application of propaganda in all spheres of life. 
Dissenters were often quelled through violent and morally objectionable means, and critical 
thought was stifled as it threatened the unifying projects of the fascist states. What makes the 
rise of these ideologies all the more horrifying, though, is that the states which imposed them 
were by and large successful in instating them as civic religions. As the most recent, blatant 
examples of artificial civic religions, they set the agenda for discussions on future civic 
religions. We have two lessons to learn from these twentieth century civic religions: 1) it is 
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 Arguably, some figures were conscious of the political expediency of assuming a unified religion. A prime 
example of this can be found in Emperor Constantine, who was renowned for using theological unity to impose 
political unity. However, as Diarmaid McCulloch points out, most of the church fathers were concerned about 
the validity of the beliefs and values of the faith to the point where they preferred divisiveness over political 
unity (2009).  
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possible to successfully create an artificial civic religion, but 2) its creation has historically 
relied on morally objectionable means. One must ask: is it possible to achieve (1) without 
(2)?  
This question will have to be explored in-depth by South African philosophers; it 
appears that some coercion is inevitable for instating a civic religion. It may be that necessity 
will push us to develop a way of satisfying (1) without going through (2). Consider what 
would happen if we fail to institute an artificial civic religion. Because civic religions are 
generally uncritically assumed, they often contain features which are not generally desirable: 
such as homophobia, patriarchy, racism or a set of religious practices which violently 
suppresses theological dissent. So, if a civic religion should arise organically in South Africa, 
it could well contain features that are unnecessarily destructive to certain features of our 
society. By consciously engineering a civic religion, we have a greater chance of avoiding 
unnecessary and/or violent exclusivity. A further worry is that South Africa will fail to 
generate a civic religion at all, and that the fragmentation of place will persist. In the previous 
chapter, I suggested that we currently have at best an uneasy truce between the different 
people groups in South Africa. Without a civic religion, there is little to stop South Africans 
from returning to the exclusivist thinking of apartheid. Developing a civic religion, then, 
becomes a necessary preventative measure, against both an objectionable organic civic 
religion and the morally dangerous persistence of the fragmentation of the South African 
place. The question, then, is: what level and type of coercion is best suited to instating our 
civic religion, and how do we avoid committing morally objectionable acts in instating this 
religion? 
Although I cannot give a conclusive answer to this question, there are some avenues 
that are promising. Philosophers do not conduct all their work outside of the public sphere. 
Although most philosophical work today is published in academic papers that are read by 
only a few specialists; at various times in history, philosophers have taken up public positions 
leading debates around the states of their societies. Obviously, one can point to Socrates as 
the prime example of the public philosopher. Yet, there are more contemporary examples. 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus operated both as specialist philosophers and public 
leaders of philosophical debates during the mid-twentieth century. Both published various 
plays and novels to express their ideas, and Sartre published at least one philosophical book 
directed at a general audience: La Question Juive (1947) (translated as Anti-Semite and Jew 
(1951)). More recently and more locally, Samantha Vice managed to stir public debate with 
her paper, ‘How Do I Live in this Strange Place?’ (2010). Although she had her paper 
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published in an academic journal, the public commentator Eusebius McKaiser brought her 
work to public attention by analysing it in widely read South African newspapers. The 
resultant discussion was both polemical and sustained, showing that the South African public 
pays attention to what academics have to say about their place. Similarly, McKaiser has 
published his own book, A Bantu in my Bathroom (2012) which has also bridged the divide 
between philosophy and public commentary. So it seems South African philosophers can 
more directly influence the public debate on values in South Africa by publicising their own 
work. It may be that South African philosophers will have to access other media; although 
South Africans have an ostensibly high literacy rate, we are not by and large avid readers. 
Apart from using newspapers and online forums to stoke a debate, philosophers should make 
use of television and radio debates to turn attention to the fragmentation of the South African 
place and ubuntu’s potential usefulness in overcoming it.  
By taking part in public debates, and by bringing ubuntu-type values and criticism 
into the public sphere, philosophers are able to create a public intellectual atmosphere which 
assumes ubuntu as a civic religion. I do not assume that these avenues of instating a civic 
religion are without problems. For one thing, it is not certain that, by creating a debate around 
the fragmentation of place in South Africa and the use of ubuntu, South Africans would adopt 
ubuntu as a civic religion. They may settle on something else that may be created by the 
debate itself. Such a response would nevertheless be an intellectual, thoroughly debated 
response to our place. So we have here an avenue that is less morally objectionable than the 
propaganda regimes of the early twentieth century. I do assume however that a more rigorous 
public debate will have a positive outcome: it will motivate people to create a civic religion 
from within, as opposed to one being forced onto them. As long as philosophers and other 
intellectuals ensure that this debate is focused on the problems of the South African place, we 
have the potential to create a civic religion based on reflection on our place. Because this 
civic religion responds to place, we have in it the foundations for a philosophical tradition 
that focuses on this place, and that will thus overcome the problem outlined in the first 
chapter. Thus, the first question we must then ask in dealing with a fragmented place is how a 
civic religion might be instated.  
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 Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Understanding Place (Chapter 2) 
 
Place 
1) Phenomenology – Subject 
Place and subject dialectically form each other 
2) Hermeneutics 
Place is a ‘meaningful space’ 
Places are narrative. 
How do places become meaningful? 
1.1) Milieu 
Embodied knowledge; 
individuated place, 
formed around the 
subject. 
Places are constructed 
around what matters. 
Places are created by 
repetitive actions and 
destroyed by disruptive 
actions. 
Our engagement with 
place shapes it. 
 
1.2) Time 
‘All subjectivity is 
time’ 
Place is dependent 
on time. 
2.1.1)     Borders 
How do we define a 
place? Places and 
identities are formed 
dialectically.  
Places can be formed 
in such a way as to 
exclude certain 
people, or 
interpretations. 
 
2.2.1)     Intensity 
Differences in 
interpretation of 
place create a 
debate which forms 
the meaning of 
place. 
1.2.1)    Provenance 
The concepts and 
practices that make a 
place come from 
other places. Part of 
the meaning a place 
is derived from 
where these 
concepts come from. 
2.1.2)      Scale 
The scale of place 
which we consider is 
dependent on the 
conversation the 
subject is involved 
in. 
 
1.1.1) Alienation 
When places are 
disrupted, the subject 
becomes alienated – 
unable to identify what 
matters in her current 
place. 
1.2.2)    Topoi 
Places display 
recurrent themes, 
repeated actions and 
events over time. 
2.1.3)      Topemes 
Places consist of 
smaller places, called 
topemes. 
2.2.2)     Listening 
and Speaking 
In order to 
understand a place, 
we need to engage 
in a critical 
discussion with 
those in the place. 
In this way we can 
identify what 
matters in that 
place. But at the 
same time, we 
contribute to the 
construction of 
place. 
1.2.3)    Trace 
Previous events and 
formulations of 
place are 
‘remembered’ in the 
way that they are 
discernible to 
subjects 
2.1.4)      
Aggregation 
How do places 
become meaningful? 
Places are holistic – 
having an 
independent meaning 
from their smaller 
topemes or from the 
larger places of 
which they 
themselves are 
topemes. 
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Figure 2 (pg. 47) 
 
(1) Framework  In order to do (1), it is necessary to first 
work from a particular example. 
(2) Particular example 
 
(2) Particular example BUT, in order to do philosophy in a 
particular place (2), one must first assume a 
framework.  (1) Framework 
 
(1) Framework So, we have reflective equilibrium. 
(2) Particular example 
 
(2) Particular example In order to do (2), we need to prove that what 
has been done so far has been ineffectual (3). 
(2) then requires that (3) be done so that 
we can be validated in doing (2). 
(3) Negative Project 
 
(3) Negative Project But (3) requires that we work from (1). 
(1) Framework 
 
So: 
 
(2) Particular Example 
(1) Framework (3) Negative Project 
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